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

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THE RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

by

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FOREWORD

I wish to express my appreciation to the professors at the Pacific School of Religion, and especially to Dr. John Wright Buckham, Professor of the Philosophy of Religion and Christian Theology, under whose guidance I have spent several fruitful years.

My work on this subject has led me to the conviction that it is the problem of us younger students of Christian thought to find a synthesis between the truth for which the Personalist School, of which Dr. Buckham was one of the founders, has stood, and such truths as are included in the newer Critical Realism which promises to play so important a part in the coming age.

Paul. F. Tjensvold

Berkeley, California
April 23, 1936

FOREWORD

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I. INTRODUCTION

There are several reasons for studying the religious implications of the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Some believe that it is the most adequate philosophy for the real purposes of religion that has appeared for some time.[1] It is also a part of that general philosophical point of view which promises to be most influential in the age that we are entering. In order to be a vital power, religion must make its peace with the dominant philosophy of the age. Other philosophies will not do as well. Sometimes this dominant philosophy is not compatible with a fully developed religion. Religion lives on, but it is not so important as it would be if it were an integral part of the thought-systems of the age. Finally religion grows. It has been able to incorporate new revelations of the nature of reality from the philosophies of the past. It is probable that the philosophy of our day contains another installment of the growing revelation of God to the world.

There are certain difficulties in determining the religious implications of Whitehead's philosophy. There has been a growth in his thought. It began as a philosophy

of Nature.[2] In its development it has shown a tendency to approach the idealistic point of view.[3] Such a trend is not peculiar to Whitehead for it is shared by many modern naturalists.[4] However, because his philosophy has been a growing one, it is difficult to give a static representation of it which will not be inadequate.[5]

Whitehead's vocabulary is very difficult. His philosophy is one of process. Most of our philosophical vocabulary has grown up while reality was conceived as being static, and in terms of substance and attribute, and of a sharp distinction between mind and matter. For this reason, the old philosophical terms often carry connotations quite at variance with the ideology of the newer philosophy. For this reason Whitehead has coined his own vocabulary. It is not ambiguous, but it is often obscure.[6] It has been suggested that Whitehead, like Hegel, will exercise a very wide philosophic influence, but that, because of the difficulties of his vocabulary it will be mainly indirectly. Other writers will popularize his ideas, but in a more easily understood language.

Finally, one of Whitehead's books, "Religion in the

Making," deals directly with the problem of religion. Therefore in considering the religious implications of Whitehead's philosophy, one must check the results against the implications which he himself has drawn.

One of Whitehead's distinctive traits is that he is a system builder. He holds that theoretical construction is important. Many modern philosophers distrust large and complicated systems. They would restrict the philosopher to the same patient care in the study of the empirical evidence on small problems, as is exercised by the physical scientists, and they decry generalizations, and the attempt to build a speculative system which will connect all sections of knowledge.[8]

However some of the leading natural scientists have emphasized the importance of theoretical construction in scientific progress.[9] Whitehead agrees with their point of view. He believes that theoretical systems are often of value for finding more truth. They are not final, but are helpful scaffolding in the advance of thought.

His philosophy is essentially synthetic. He finds a balance between seemingly conflicting truths. Thus his system has a balance between naturalistic realism and

idealism. It has a place for both the changing and the permanent. Into its organic concept can be fitted both the One and the many. Both are organic parts of his system. This synthetic character is probably due to:

"an unflinching determination to take the whole evidence into account."

This is

> "The only method of preservation against the fluctuating extremes of fashionable opinion." "There are short cuts leading merely to an illusory success. It is easy enough to find a theory, logically harmonious, and with important applications in the region of fact, provided you are content to disregard half your evidence."[10]

One should

"Seek simplicity" but "distrust it."[11]

Whitehead intends that his system building shall be hypothetical. Theoretical constructions are but instruments with which to garner more knowledge. In the evolution of real knowledge a contradition is an opportunity to discover some deeper truth which the old system did not include.[12] Empirical facts must not be discredited for lack of conformity with any theoretical system, for history has proven that the "seeming nonsense" of today is often the "demonstrated truth" of tomorrow.[13]

In this garnering of more knowledge "the true method

of philosophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the best that one can, and unflinchingly to explore the interpretation of experience in terms of that scheme."[14]

There are several outstanding elements in Whitehead's system:

(1) It is a philosophy that emphasizes the changing nature of reality. A place for process is found in his doctrine of "events." Within the actual world there is a creativity whereby that which is new comes into being in time.

(2) Reality has a permanent element also. The place for stability and order is made by the doctrine of "Eternal Objects." These "Eternal Objects," are the possible order of "events." They are ideal entities, which, although not actual themselves, are "exemplified in everything that is actual, according to some proportion of relevance."[15]

(3) The organic character of reality springs from the action of the Principle of Concretion. This Principle of Concretion is an actual, but non-temporal entity which determines which of the many possibilities

shall become actual. Through it, "the indetermination of mere creativity is transmitted into a determinate freedom." It is not only the source of freedom, but also the basis for empiricism. "This non-temporal actual entity is what men call God--the supreme God of rationalized religion."[16] It is from the character of God, that every actual entity has a definite bond with every other entity in the universe. Thus God gives to the universe its organic character.

Whitehead's philosophy is one organism. Reality is not thought of in terms of the dead mindlessness of mechanism, nor in terms of the abstractness of the mind by itself, but wholly in terms of organisms, which are analogous to living things.

There is a close connection between the outstanding elements in Whitehead's system and some aspects of his theory of knowledge. The nature of the "Eternal Objects" makes a place for a rational element in epistemology. Because these possibilities are essentially rational, it is possible to discover them by "a priori" thinking. Modern epistemology makes a mistake when it lays its exclusive stress upon sense-perception for

the provision of data respecting Nature. Sense-perception does not provide the data in terms of which we interpret it.[17]

The action of the Principle of Concretion is the basis for empiricism. The actuality is but one out of a vast variety of possibilities. Therefore the nature of actuality cannot be discovered by pure thought, but must be discovered empirically. Thus Whitehead seems to agree with Bertrand Russell that the purpose of logic is to search out the vast number of possibilities. The choice between them must be made empirically. Logic is overstepping its sphere when it endeavors to reach actuality by process of eliminating possibilities through the discovery of contradictions.[18]

A contradiction merely shows that a mistake has been made and nothing more. Seeming nonsense often becomes demonstrated truth.[19]

All our knowledge of the empirical actuality is mediated by "our bodily sense organs, such as eyes, palates, noses, ears, and the diffused bodily organization furnishing touches, aches, and other bodily sensations." There is no place for intuition as such.

All our perceptions are bare sensations "in patterned connections" and received "in the immediate present." "Our experience of a social world is an interpretative reaction wholly derivative from this perception." "Our emotional and purposive experience is a reflective reaction derived from the original perception and intertwined with the interpretative reaction and partly shaping it."[20]

Whitehead is opposed to the "bifurcating" of nature into the two divisions of "the nature apprehended in awareness, and the nature which is the cause of that awareness." The only real nature "is the fact apprehended in awareness," which "holds within it the greenness of the trees, the song of the birds, the warmth of the sun, the hardness of the chairs, the feel of the velvet."

The other nature which is supposed to be the cause of awareness is not real, but is a mental construction. It is a "conjectural system of molecules and electrons," which is supposed so to affect "the mind as to produce the awareness of apparent nature."[21]

But this "apparent" nature, which we actually perceive with all its qualities is the one that is actual and real. Whitehead agrees with Berkeley that "Nature is that which we observe in perception through the senses."[22]

But this nature exists in its own right and is not a product of our thinking. It is "a closed system whose mutual relations do not require the expression of the fact that they are thought about."[23] "The understanding which is sought by science is an understanding of reactions within nature,"[24] and not of the relationship of nature to mind.

It will be noted that "what we observe in perception through the senses" is thus made "the objective facts of the world of nature and of reality." But "in spite (or because) of such objectivity such happenings remain ultimately and inescapably relative." Therefore "such relativity" must be "an ultimate fact about the objective world."[25] Mr. A. E. Murphy finds this "Objective Relativism" in Dewey as well as in Whitehead.

There is certainly a sense in which Whitehead would agree that "everything is what it is experienced as." However Whitehead would not hold that the totality of reality is included in our experience, but only that what we do, experience, is real, and not an illusion. Everything exists as we experience it, but we do not experience everything that exists.

It is natural that a system builder in philosophy should admire "the greatness in the lives of those who build up religious systems." It is also natural that one who holds that all systems are hypothetical, deriving their value from their usefulness as instruments in the advance of knowledge, should also admire the rebels, who "armed with passionate sincerity" "destroy such systems."[26]

Religion requires a metaphysical backing. Without it, "its authority is endangered by the emotions which it generates." An historical investigation is not adequate, for such an investigation implies a metaphysic. "Science can leave its metaphysic implicit, and retire behind our belief in the pragmatic value of its general descriptions. If religion does that, it

admits that its dogmas are merely pleasing ideas for the purpose of stimulating emotions." "When religion ceases to seek for penetration, for clarity, it is sinking back into its lower forms. The ages of faith are the ages of rationalism."[27]

Whitehead roots religion in the total cosmology. Its foundation is "our apprehension of those permanent elements by reason of which there is a stable order in the world, permanent elements apart from which there could be no changing world."[28]

Religious belief must be based upon religious experience. In a sense we intuit the values in the universe, but there is no special religious sense. The existence of the objects of religion is an inference from righteousness and beauty. A metaphysic which wishes to adequately picture the universe must not ignore those insights which form the bases of religion for often "the best rendering of experience, expressing its general form divested of irrelevant details is to be found in the utterances of religious aspirations." Thus the hymn "Abide with Me, Fast falls the

eventide," expresses both permanence and flux in one integral experience. Most of these insights are feelings rather than thoughts. These feelings "constitute the ultimate religious evidence, beyond which there is no appeal." "One of the reasons for the thinness of so much modern metaphysics is its neglect of the wealth of expression of ultimate feeling," which is found in the utterances of religious aspirations.[29] These insights often emphasize the more "tender elements in the world, which slowly and in quietness operate in love." They find "purpose in the present immediacy of the kingdom not of this world."[30] Feeling is important in the world as a whole, and it is especially important in religion.

Religion is thus an experience of the essential nature of the whole. In it we see the forest unhampered by the trees, or rather the various factors of the environment are so ordered as to produce on us one unified effect.[31] The profound intuitions afforded by religious experience must be integrated with our other knowledge about the universe. Because

it deals directly with the whole, religion must be even more insistent than science that it should discover the nature of that whole. In our view of this whole, we see the values of Goodness, Love, Beauty, together with Order and Purpose. We do not directly intuit God but we infer the existence of the objects of religious belief from these values which we can sense directly. Or perhaps, it would be better to say that when we see goodness, beauty, truth, order, purpose, and community of interest, we do see God.

Religious doctrine should be tested by the same criteria that we apply to other truths.

> "In human nature there is no such separate function ~~from knowledge~~ as a special religious sense."
>
> "Religious truth must be developed from knowledge acquired when our ordinary senses and intellectual operations are at their highest pitch of discipline. To move one step from this position towards the dark recesses of abnormal psychology is to surrender finally any hope of a solid foundation for religious doctrine."
>
> The peculiar character of religious truth is "not that it comes from any special source, but
> "that it explicitly deals with values."[32]

The doctrine of revelation has often implied a supernatural revealing of the nature of transcendent reality to human beings. Such a conception of revelation is foreign to Whitehead's system. In it God's part in revelation consists in His incarnation of Himself, and of transcendent values into the actual world. Revelation is God's immanence in the universe, and finds its completion whem human insight is able to extract the essential in the universe from the superficial and transient. We cannot know God transcendent, or of transcendent values, except in so far as they become immanent in the actuality which we sense directly. Thus there is a functional revelation consisting of human insight into the transcendent values implied by the immanence of God in the actual universe.

The life of Jesus is a part of this revelation. In it human beings have gained an insight into universal values. Whitehead's view of revelation seems to be somewhat external. The insights, which he emphasizes are those which come from objective events, rather than from inner consciousness. This emphasis upon the external and objective is typical of a large

amount of modern thought. It is a reaction against the vast amount of error which has commonly vitiated more subjective approaches to the nature of reality.

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II

THE CHANGING NATURE OF REALITY

Creativity

Process and change are very important in Whitehead's system. Its essence appears to be the "attempt to combine a philosophy of real process.....with a form of Platonism."[1] The total world is an organism which is incomplete, but is in the process of production. Within this total organic community of actual things, each actual entity is also an organic process, thus repeating "in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm."[2] Thus all actuality is incomplete and moves toward the future. No actuality is static.

> "Process, activity, and change are the matter of fact. At an instant there is nothing. Each instant is only a way of grouping matters of fact. Thus, since there are no instants, conceived as simple primary entities, there is no Nature at an instant. Thus all the interrelations of matters of fact must involve transition in their essence."[3]

Thus Whitehead thinks of the basic constituents of reality as being always changeful. Like Bertrand Russell he speaks of "events" rather than of "substance." He believes that the nature of things is essentially a happening, and that growth and the creative process must be taken as fundamental. Creativity is the basic constituent of the world. Thus it corresponds "with the Aristotelian 'matter'"

and modern 'neutral stuff,' "but it is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 'form' or of 'external relations'." It "is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which Aristotelian 'matter' is without a character of its own." "It is the pure notion of activity."[4]

The Abstractness of Objects

Because matter is a mere passage of events, objects must be abstract. Whitehead often speaks of 'misplaced concreteness.' Matter, when thought of as existent in its own right, is an example of such misplaced concreteness. The real existent is the passage of events. Our minds abstract the objects out from the flux of events. An event is not a new kind of object. If so thought of, it must "appear a very poor and subjective one."[6] Objects are just as abstract as are what we call their qualities. There is no need to posit a separate world for objects. In their abstractness, they are very much at home with other abstract entities.[7] Thus in Whitehead's system, the usual distinction between the abstract and the concrete disappears. Many supposedly concrete objects are in reality very abstract, and many supposedly abstract entities are just as real as are any that we call concrete. This fact of the actuality of the abstract is very important, because both personality

and the spiritual as a whole, belong to a realm which we have commonly conceived of as being 'abstract', namely that of relationships.

In Whitehead's system, an object does not belong to a different and higher form of reality than a relationship. Therefore, the material does not belong to a different and higher form of reality than the spiritual.

That group of relationships which we call the spiritual is an essential aspect of actuality, and does not differ in its degree of abstractness or of objectivity from the other aspects of actuality. In this, we are speaking of personality, and of the spiritual as we know it. In the world of actuality, personality and the spiritual belong to the realm of relationships, but they may also imply some transcendent but non-actual, reality. Such a reality would also belong to the realm of the abstract. Thus personality and the realm of the spiritual have an actual existence, only because those qualities and relationships which we have commonly called "abstract," are just as real as those which we have called "concrete." It is this breakdown of the distinction between the abstract and the concrete in Whitehead's system, that makes possible the actual existence of personality and of the spiritual. Dr. Buckham has said that

"Persons are not objective in the same unresponsive way as are objects."[8] Whitehead would add that objects also are not objective in the unresponsive way in which we have imagined that they are.

Life and Matter

Both the material and the spiritual share in the changeful nature of reality.

There is a sense in which change does not always take place at the same rate. Both life and matter are changing. In life, the change is taking new forms. In matter the change repeats itself, so that the new does not emerge. Matter is process which has gotten into a rut. From this point of view a "hardening of ideas" is essentially a relapsing into matter, and a step toward death. "The unit of life is essentially a changing unit."[9]

Whitehead would thus agree with Bertrand Russell that the constituent elements of mind and matter are the same, but that these constituent "events" are merely arranged according to different plans. Matter is an arrangement of "events" in which there is a tendency for change to repeat itself. Life and mind are arrangements of "events" in

which change causes new combinations to emerge. As creativity is active in the lowest levels of matter, and some degree of lack of fluidity exists in even the highest forms of life, it must be noted that the difference between mind and matter is not primarily one of kind, but is one of degree. However it has been said that a large enough difference in degree becomes one of kind.

The Changing Character of Religion

Religion shares in the changing character of the universe as a whole. One of Whitehead's purposes in "Religion in the Making" is "to exhibit the inevitable transformation of religion with the transformation of knowledge."[10] Religion has four elements of ritual, emotion, belief, and rationalization.[11] Of these, "ritual goes back beyond the dawn of history." Even animals and birds habitually perform "definite actions which have no direct relevance to the preservation of the physical organisms of the actors." This is "the primitive outcome of superfluous energy and leisure," and "exemplifies the tendency of living bodies to repeat their own actions." Ritual acts as a "stimulus to emotion and an habitual

ritual may diverge into religion or into play according to the quality of the emotion excited."[12] "Ritual and emotion cannot maintain themselves untouched by intellectuality." The result is a myth which explains the ritual and reinforces its purpose which is emotion.[13] If the hero be a person we call the ritual with its myth "religion," but if the hero be a thing we call it "magic." "Religion sometimes is progressive."[14] The last element to emerge is rationalization.

> "Rational religion is religion whose beliefs and rituals have been reorganized with the aim of making it the central element in a coherent ordering of life--an ordering which shall be coherent both in respect to the elucidation of thought, and in respect to the direction of conduct towards a unified purpose commanding ethical approval."[15]

> "Theoretically, rational religion could have arisen in complete independence of the antecedent social religions of ritual and mythical beliefs."

Actually, it did emerge "as a gradual transformation of the pre-existing religious forms." This "emergence of rational religion was strictly conditioned by the general progress of the races in which it arose."[16]

The Results of The Progressive Character of Religion

Thus, rational religion comes from, but is not identifiable with the earlier forms. The word "religion"

has covered an historical development which has contained elements which were quite diverse. Even today, many different kinds of things have come from that development and bear the same ambiguous name of "religion."

Neither the nature nor the norm of religion can be discovered by an investigation of origins. They may only be found by a search through the highest in religion which has been produced to date and a vision of the ends toward which the evolutionary processes are working. There are emergent elements in religion as well as in other spheres. Modern rational religion is quite distinct from some of the phenomena which form its historical background.

Religion is important. It is not necessarily good.[17] Historically there is

> "a melancholy record of the horrors which can attend religion: human sacrifice, and in particular the slaughter of children, the cannibalism, sensual orgies, abject superstition, hatred as between races, the maintenance of degrading customs, hysterics, bigotry, all can be laid at its charge. Religion is the last refuge of human savagery. The uncritical association of religion with goodness is directly negatived by plain facts."

Religion as an Instrument of Progress

However this is not the whole story. "Religion can be, and has been the main instrument for progress."[18] Generally it has been an instrument for the advancement of the race. First "ritual encouraged emotion beyond the mere response to practical necessities," then belief came to make "a new formative agent in the ascent of man" in that it begot "thoughts divorced from the mere battling with the pressure of circumstances". Although religion can be a source of progress, it need not be so, especially when its dominant feature is this stage of uncritized belief."[19] It may make for stabilization, and persist because it meets the pragmatic tests of life. "This is the stage of religious evolution in which the masses of semi-civilized humanity have halted."[20]

However, the fact that the usefulness of some particular kind of religious phenomena is not apparent does not prove that it is without value. Whitehead would seem to hold that one of religion's major values is the fact that it has made a place for that which superficially was not practical. Society could not have progressed if it had never passed beyond the practical. Often the foolishness of this world is the wisdom of God.

> "Any social routine whose purposes are not obvious to our analysis is" (not) "thereby to be condemned as foolish. We can observe insects performing elaborate routine actions whose purposes they cannot possibly understand, which yet are essential either for their own survival or for race survival."[21]

The importance of religion is not limited to past history. Whitehead would agree that

> "One of the tragic defects of our culture is the absence of a well-thought-out and also deeply-felt-out philosophy of life. Human nature abhors a spiritual vacuum."[22]

He closes his essay on the Aims of Education with the statement that

> "The essence of education is that it be religious. Pray, what is religious education? A religious education is an education which inculcates duty and reverence. Duty arises from our potential control over the course of events. Where attainable knowledge could have changed the issue, ignorance has the guilt of vice. And the foundation of reverence is this perception that the present holds within itself the complete sum of existence backwards and forwards, that ~~the~~ whole amplitude of time, which is eternity."[23]

Religion and Science

This progressive nature of religion has a bearing upon the so-called conflict between religion and science. "There has always been a conflict between religion and science" because "both religion and science have always been in a

state of continual development."[24] Within the respective fields themselves, these have been conflicts also which were due to an unequal rate of progress. This rise of contradictions within growing thought is not a liability, but is actually an opportunity for further growth, for a "clash is a sign that there are wider truths and finer perspectives within which a reconciliation of a deeper religion and a more subtle science will be found." "In one sense therefore the conflict between science and religion is a slight matter which has been unduly emphasized."[25] Scientists have recognized the necessity for growth, but many religionists of the past bitterly opposed scientific advance. They have often been so hasty and superficial in their thinking as to be blind to the real implications of the new theories.[26] Religionists must change their view of growth. The defeats which religion sustained in her controversies with science were not necessary, but were entirely due to the idea of the religionists that religion was a static field.

Because of this false attitude toward change,

> "religion is tending to degenerate into a decent formula wherewith to embellish a comfortable life.

Consider this contrast: when Darwin or Einstein proclaim theories which modify our ideas, it

> is a triumph for science. We do not go about saying that there is another defeat for science because its old ideas have been abandoned. We know that another step of scientific insight has been gained.
>
> "Religion will not regain its old power until it can face change in the same spirit as does science. Its principles may be eternal, but the expression of these principles requires continual development."[27]

In Whitehead's system, not only is creativity the basic constituent of the universe, with both the world and religion in the process of growth, but even God grows. In the realm of the actual there is no place for that which changeth not. Permanence finds its only place in the realm of ideal forms.

However it should be noted that God belongs more to the realm of the permanent than to that of the changing. "In God is nature, permanence is primordial, and flux is derivative from the World: in the World's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God."[28]

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III

THE PERMANENT NATURE OF REALITY

The Source of Permanence

Reality is always changing, but it also has elements of permanence. It is the doctrine of "events" that makes a place for change. It is in a realm of ideal forms that we discover permanence. The flux of Whitehead's system would result in chaos, if he did not thus make a place both for permanence and order in his doctrine of "eternal objects."[1] Heraclitus needed his doctrine of the "Logos" for the same purpose. These eternal objects have been thought to correspond to Plato's "ideas." However, unlike "ideas" "eternal objects" are not static realities, but are things that grow, being the possible series of events. "Possibility" is essentially the idea. Actuality is a limitation imposed on possibility. In actuality some of the possibilities are left out.[2]

Order is brought into creativity by reason of these essentially rational "eternal objects." They also make possible a much richer view of nature than would be possible in a philosophy which merely had creativity acting in space-time.

The Permanent in Religion

Religion is founded "on our apprehension of those permanent elements by reason of which there is a stable order in the world."[3] It is

> "the vision of something which stands beyond, behind, and within, the passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is remote possibility, and yet the greatest of present facts, something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach, something which is the ultimate ideal and the hopeless quest."[4]

It is the search for these permanent elements that gives to religion a certain quality of "beyondness." This quality of "beyondness" should make a place for mysticism. One intuits a divine order to which religion is loyalty.[5] That is, religion is a feeling-response to a vision of the divine order. The highest type of religion is world loyalty. A kind of mysticism could find a place in this system as a viewing or insight into this Beyond. Morality could be conceived of as the attempt to more fully incorporate its meaning into our present life.

Religion and Value

Religion thus takes its rise from the "sense of values within the structure of being." So do science, art, and morality. "The ultimate motive power alike in science, in morality, and in religion, is the sense of value." This "sense of importance" "takes the various forms of wonder, of curiosity, of reverence, of worship, of tumultuous desire for merging personality in something beyond itself."[6] Value is not distinct from existence. "There is no such thing as mere value." Value is "the intrinsic reality of an event."[7]

Whitehead lays his emphasis upon aesthetic values. The foundations of the world are to be found "in the aesthetic experience rather than in the cognitive and conceptive experience. All order is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely certain aspects of aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God."[8] It is true that the word "aesthetic" does not seem to do justice to the "strenuous, practical, experimental nature of religion at its best."[9] However, as used by Whitehead, it includes the "moral." Its emphasis is upon the feeling-response which the constituent order of reality

arouses within the human being. This use of the word aesthetic avoids a misunderstanding which the use of the word moral would involve. Whitehead has a place in religion for the "moral" in the sense of a feeling-response to an ideal set of values, but not in the sense of a "set of isolated prohibitions." "The desire for a comfortable organization of modern society" is a "non-religious" motive." An "insistence upon rules of conduct marks the ebb of religious fervor."[10]

> "The great religions of civilization include among their original elements revolts against the inculcation of morals as a set of isolated prohibitions. Morality, in the petty negative sense of the term, is the deadliest enemy of religion. Paul denounces the Law, and the Gospels are vehement against the Pharisees. Every outbreak of religion exhibits the same intensity of antagonism--an antagonism diminishing as religion fades."[11]

Morality in this lower sense has no part in religion. Morality in its higher sense, of the attempt to incorporate our heavenly vision into our earthly life is an important part of religion.

The Transcendent Nature of Religion

There is a transcendent quality to both religion and true morality. Religion is more than a product of those elements in life which have survival value. It roots in the ultimate values of reality. "The religious life is not a research after comfort."[12] Morality and religion are not things of this earth, earthy, but are our relationship to the basic realities of the universe. This does not deny that they are good for human beings. It does insist that in their essence, they transcend human life. Religion is loyalty to the values of the universe as a whole. Human life is but a part, howbeit, a very important part, of this whole.

This view gives an objective character to religion and to morality. It does not necessarily deny the truth included in a more subjective point of view. Man is the measure of all things, not because he is their totality, but simply because we cannot know the transcendent except in so far as it is immanent in that which we do know. A religion or a morality which is good for man must be so because at least partially it corresponds with some elements in the nature of the universe as a whole, and on the other hand, that which is true should also be useful.

It appears that Whitehead is correct in this opposition to morality in its lower sense. The formal ethics, which mark the ebb of religion are not in line with the Ideal. Neither are they good for mankind. The desire so to modify actuality as to incorporate in it transcendent values, is in accordance with our vision of the ideal nature of the universe. It should also work for the more abundant life for human beings. "Where there is no vision, the people perish," but in dealing with visions, it is "By their fruits that we know them."

God as the Source of Value

A certain aspect of the nature of God is among the permanent elements in the universe. God is the source of values. The concept of God is one of the most important in both religion and philosophy. God has a primordial nature by which we mean that order of values which is necessary in the realm of possibilities for anything to become actual.

> "The universe exhibits a creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with infinite possibilities, but this creativity and these forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from the completed ideal harmony which is God."[13]

For actual existence, there must be some order of values to choose between the various possibilities. This chooser or determiner must be some kind of Cosmic Intelligence.

Because God contains this order of values, all progress and value must be measured in terms of God.[14] A world containing levels of value must necessarily be a teleological world.[15] The end towards which the world seems to be traveling is one of greater order and greater integration. Progress is a relative thing. "The immanence of God gives reason for the belief that pure chaos is intrinsically impossible." "The immensity of the world negatives the belief that any state of order can be so established that beyond it there can be no progress."[16]

God as the Source of Order

God is the source of order as well as of value. In religious insight we recognize that

> "the order of the world, the depth of the reality of the world in its whole and in its parts, the beauty of the world, the zest of life, and the mastery of evil, are all bound up together" (by) "the completed ideal harmony which is God."[17]

Their close interrelation is not accidental. We could not have science without an instinctive belief that there is

an order in nature. However scientific order is not the most important type of order in the universe: neither is moral order. Whitehead believes that aesthetic order is more important than either moral or conceptual order.[18] Aesthetic order is richer and fuller, being the order of the actual world as a whole, whereas conceptual and moral order pertain only to certain aspects of the world. The moral order and the conceptual order are parts of the aesthetic. The controlling order of the universe is not the moral or the conceptual, but the aesthetic and therefore God is to be found in the aesthetic order.[19] God conceived as the aesthetic order is primarily potential. He becomes actual as he becomes immanent in the world. Thus God creates the world and the world makes God actual. Beauty is God's incarnation in the world.

God as the Primordial order of aesthetic values is unconscious. He also lacks "fulness of feeling." He becomes conscious as He is incarnated into the world-process. Of course, it is an abstract distinction of reason to thus separate the Primordial nature of God from the Consequent. However, "by reason of this primordial actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of beings, there is an order in the relevance of eternal objects to the purpose

of creation."[20]

Creation could not take place without this order of nature. We do not have

> "an actual world which accidentally happens to exhibit an order of nature. There is an actual world because there is an order in nature. If there were no order, there would be no world. Also since there is a world we know that there is an order. The ordering entity is a necessary element in the metaphysical situation presented by the actual world."[21]

This argument extends that of Kant. It sees the necessity of God not only in the moral order, but also in the aesthetic order of the cosmos as a whole.

God as the Source of Meaning

This primordial nature of God contains "envisagement" of all "eternal objects" and thus transcends the world process, but it is not conscious. It is the consequent nature of God which is conscious.[22] If this primordial nature were all there were to God he could not be personal. However it is but one element in the complex nature of the Godhead. This primordial order gives meaning to the universe. God is the inherent nature of all being.[23] He gives meaning to life as a whole. "He gives to suffering its swift insight into values which can issue from it."[24]

He contains the ideal for each human life. All that we should like to be and are not are in Him. In this aspect of His being, God is unchanging. He is an Ideal or perfection toward which change moves. The other aspect of His being and the actual universe is the attempt to incorporate this ideal order into actuality. God's vision accomplishes "its purpose of completion" by "absorbing the World's multiplicity of effort."[25] God is an ideal vision of harmony. He includes in himself "a synthesis of the total universe" and "is the measure of the aesthetic consistency of the world." God is the Kingdom of Heaven."[26] He is

> "that function in the world by reason of which our purposes are directed. God is the one systematic complete fact, which is the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act.[27] God in the world is the perpetual vision of the road which leads to the deeper realities. God is that function in the world by reason of which our purposes are directed to ends which in our own consciousness are impartial to our interests. He is that element in life in virtue of which judgment stretches beyond--facts of existence to values of existence. He is that element in virtue of which our purposes extend beyond values for ourselves to values for others. He is that element in virtue of which the attainment of such a value for others transforms itself into value for ourselves."[28]

The Problem of Transcendence

We must here discuss the relationship of Whitehead's system to the problem of transcendence.

These permanent elements of reality transcend the actual world in which we live. We know of them by an a priori use of reason, plus a knowledge of their effects when they become incarnate in the actual world, but they must have a real existence beyond the actual world, for they are only partially immanent in the present universe. It has been said that certain realists in theology equate God with the Logos. This is not true of Whitehead. It is true that the emphasis in Whitehead's system falls upon those aspects of the Divine Nature to which the Greek and Christian conception of Logos was applied, and it may be true that in denying consciousness to the transcendent element in the Godhead, Whitehead makes it impossible to adequately deal with its full nature, yet it is obvious that he recognizes that there is this transcendent element to the world.

This recognition of the fact of transcendence is very important for a philosophy which is adequately to deal with the fact of evil and of progress. The very existence of both morality and religion is dependent upon the emotional tension, which comes from the vision of values not yet fully

immanent in actuality. It would appear that Whitehead's recognition of the existence of these transcendent elements in reality is adequate both for the needs of thought and of the practical religious life. If the transcendent element is adequately recognized, the relative emphasis upon God immanent, or the Logos may very well be helpful rather than harmful to the religious life.

This transcendent order of values which lies beyond the actual world corresponds closely with God the Father of the Christian Trinity except that Christian thinkers have not attempted to limit consciousness to the immanent aspects of the Divine Nature as seems to be done by Whitehead. The key to this peculiarity of Whitehead's thinking probably lies in the fact that Whitehead's system does not include a time in which the world together with the immanent aspects of the divine nature did not exist. The division of the Divine Nature into aspects as is done both by Whitehead and by the older Christian theology is very helpful to human thinking, but probably corresponds to differences in our various means of knowing of the Divine existence, rather than to separate parts in the Godhead itself. Thus, consciousness and personality would be a part of that revelation of the Godhead which we receive from the divine

elements immanent in the universe and would not necessarily be included among the transcendent elements which our a priori reasoning tells us must lie behind the values actually incarnate in the universe together with its movement toward greater values. If Whitehead, like some of the Christian theologians, had thought of the world as coming into existence in time, then consciousness would be a necessary element also in the transcendent aspects of the Godhead for it is unthinkable that God became conscious in time. However in our understanding of Whitehead's system God was always conscious because he always had a universe to be conscious of. No existence, not even God, can exist by itself. Thus the denial that consciousness belongs to the transcendent aspect of God's nature is not a denial of either consciousness or personality to God either now or at some past time, because God's nature always included the immanent elements which are conscious and which we hope to show are also truly personal. Dr. Buckham claims that Purpose cannot be solely immanent, but must also be transcendent.[29] Whitehead also seems to feel that this transcendent order of values is necessary for an Immanent Purpose in the world. The strange thing is that Whitehead does not make this transcendent purpose conscious in its own

right. This transcendent order of ideal values if considered apart from a conscious purpose does not seem to be adequate for Purpose seems to imply consciousness.

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IV

THE ORGANIC NATURE OF REALITY

Nature as an Organism

Reality is always organic in character. Not only is the universe as a whole one great organism, but it is also made up of minor organisms. Besides the primary organisms,

> "there are organisms of organisms. Suppose for the moment, and for the sake of simplicity, we assume, without any evidence, that electrons and hydrogen nuclei are such basic organisms. Then the atoms and the molecules are organisms of a higher type, which also represent a compact definite organic unity. But when we come to the larger aggregations of matter, the organic unity fades into the background. It appears to be but faint and elementary. It is there, but the pattern is vague and indecisive. It is a mere aggregation of effects. When we come to living beings, the definiteness of pattern is recovered, and the organic character again rises into prominence. Accordingly, the characteristic laws of inorganic matter are mainly the statistical averages, resulting from confused aggregates. So far are they from throwing light on the ultimate nature of things, that they blur and obliterate the individual characters of the individual organisms. If we wish to throw light upon the facts relating to organisms, we must study either the individual molecules and electrons or the individual living things. In between, we find comparative confusion."[1]

History of the Organic Conception

Whitehead's conception of organism has roots in the past. The Romantic Movement in literature was in part a revolt against the materialistic and rationalistic conceptions of the older science. Kant was the forerunner of a movement in philosophy which shifted the emphasis from the mathematical to the qualitative. Whitehead even considers mathematics itself as a complex of different relations which are capable of being completely expressed in exclusively qualitative terms."[2] This movement made the evolutionary sciences possible, and they again reacted upon philosophy in favor of organic conceptions.[3] Berkeley also was a forerunner of this movement. Finally, "Bergson introduced into philosophy the organic conceptions of physiological science. He has most completely moved away from the static materialism of the seventeenth century."[4]

Not only Whitehead, but many other Realistic philosophers also, follow Bergson in an emphasis upon change and creativity on the one hand, and in moving away from the conceptions of mechanism on the other. This movement has been accentuated by "the shift from materialism to organism as the basic idea of physical science."[5] The New Physics

with its relativity, quanta, and the breaking up of the atom has made the older materialism impossible. "The old foundations of scientific thought are becoming unintelligible. Time, space, matter, material, ether, electricity, organism, configuration, structure, pattern, function, all require reinterpretation."[6] The time has come, when science "must become philosophical, and must enter upon a thorough criticism of its own foundations."[7]

The "matter" of the old "scientific materialism" is supposed to follow "a fixed routine imposed by external relations, which do not spring from the nature of its being." This assumption is "entirely unsuited to the scientific situation at which we have arrived."[8]

The concept of organism when applied to science will emphasize "internal relatedness" at the expense of the "external relations" of the mechanical view. It will also tend to break down the isolation of the physical from the life sciences. But it is not adequate to say that one is reading "the outlook of biology downward to the inorganic."[9] For, as Sellars points out, the new outlook is demanded by the texture of the universe as a whole. The essence of a philosophy of organism is that particles of the universe are organically connected with one another,

and the whole. They extend beyond that which can be seen.[10]

The Social Nature of Reality

The organic nature of the universe makes reality as a whole social in character.

> "There is no entity, not even God, which requires nothing but itself in order to exist. Every entity is in its essence social and requires the society in order to exist. In fact, the society for each entity, actual or ideal, is the all inclusive universe, including its ideal forms."[11]

In his analysis of space-time, Whitehead shows that "every unit of space or time, no matter how small, involves all the rest of space and time."[12] But everything exists in space-time. Therefore everything in some degree involves all the rest of the universe. "The waves as they roll on to the Cornish coast tell of a gale in mid-Atlantic."[13] Other entities also resemble Faraday's electric charge in being everywhere.

They have tentacles that stretch out in all directions. "An actual entity has a perfectly definite bond with each item in the universe. This determinate bond is its prehension of that item."[14] This kind of bond, which Whitehead denominates a "prehension" is in some ways parallel

to a "perception." However a "perception" is conceived in passive terms, whereas the "prehension" is conceived as both an active taking of notice, and as a creative kind of unification in the process of perceiving. Also the "prehension" is more nearly allied to feeling than to thought.

The degree of strength of its "prehensions" is the test of the relative highness or lowness of any entity. Whitehead believes that there are levels of existence. Those levels are highest in which the particulars have a strongly social nature, that is, have bonds which are close with a great many other entities; other levels are comparatively low, in so far as they "prehend" less richly. God is highest because he has close bonds with all of actuality. The inanimate is low, because its social nature is but slight.

But every entity including those on the lower levels is ~~are~~ so connected with all other entities as to be truly representative of reality as a whole. Because "each unit has in its nature a reference to every other member of the community," "each unit is a microcosm representing in itself the entire all-inclusive universe."[15]

Whitehead would thus agree with Tennyson that if we knew the little flower in the crannied wall, all in all,

and root and all, we should know what God and man are. The flower "prehends" all reality, and the whole universe is "concreted" in the flower.[16]

This social nature is as true of the inanimate as of the animate. "The group of agitations which we term matter is fused into its environment. There is no possibility of a detached self-contained local existence. The environment enters into the nature of each thing."[17] As a matter of fact, "matter," as commonly conceived disappears in Whitehead's system. "The notion of the self-contained particle of matter, self-sufficient within its local habitation is an abstraction." However "an abstraction is nothing else than the omission of part of the truth" and "is well founded when the conclusion drawn from it is not vitiated by the omitted truth."[18]

> "The whole concept of materialism only applies to very abstract entities, the products of logical discernment. The concrete enduring entities, are organisms, so that the plan of the whole influences the very characters of various subordinate organisms which enter into it. In the case of an animal, the mental states enter into the plan of the total organism, and thus modify the plans of the successive subordinate organisms until the ultimate smallest organisms, such as electrons are reached. Thus an electron within a living body is different from an electron outside it by reason of the plan of the body."[19]

An analogy may help us to understand Whitehead's thought. He conceives electrons and atoms as organisms. Matter is made up of them. Now anyone who has watched a crowd of people entering a ferry-boat must have noted that the movements of men in the mass are often closely analogous to those of water. If one were not aware of the presence of separate individuals endowed with freedom, one might attempt to find natural laws governing the movements of men in a mass. Similarly, Whitehead holds that "the characteristic laws of inorganic matter are mainly the statistical averages resulting from confused aggregates."[20]

The true realities are organisms, which by reason of being parts of a greater organism of organisms, are social in nature. The unity of such an object as a chair is but a superficial unity.

Mind and Nature

Mind holds an important place in the philosophy of organism. Whitehead claims that a "sharp division between mentality and Nature has no ground in our fundamental observation. We find ourselves living within Nature." Therefore "we should conceive mental operations as among

the factors which make up the constitution of nature." Mind must make a difference for there are no "idle wheels in the process of Nature. Every factor which emerges makes a difference, and that difference can only be expressed in terms of the individual character of that factor." Therefore we must define "natural facts, so as to understand how mental occurrences are operative in conditioning the subsequent course of Nature."[21]

Obviously mind controls human beings. In them, foresight determines purpose and purpose issues in conduct.[22] But mind must also influence matter. The emergence of human reason in the evolutionary process would be "inexplicable if purpose be ineffective." The attempt to explain living organisms wholly in terms of physics and chemistry, when extended into a denial of purpose and mind is "a colossal example of anti-empirical dogmatism arising from a successful methodology. Evidence which lies outside the method simply does not count."[23] To be truly satisfactory, a "cosmology must explain the interweaving of efficient and final causation."[24] Even the electron "runs within the body in accordance with its character within the body; that is to say, in accordance with the general plan of the body, and this plan includes the mental state."[25]

Whitehead believes that something parallel to conscious purpose is found far down on the evolutionary scale. Thus, thirst "is an example at a low level which shows the germ of a free imagination."[26] Sellars, who shares Whitehead's point of view in part, claims that we have "got beyond the old dilemna of purpose versus blind chance. The modern naturalist holds that order is intrinsic to nature however far down we go, that the units of nature are social and unite in ways expressive of their nature and context. Such a view is coming to be called organic in contrast to the traditional type of atomic mechanicalism which ignored internal bonds in nature."[27]

This extension of something parallel to purpose to the lower levels of existence is brought out by some aspects of Whitehead's use of the term "prehensions." These are the bonds uniting all entities with each other. Whitehead equates "positive prehensions" with "feeling." Thus the world is rather a great "feeling" than a great thought.

The Social Nature of Religion

The fact that Whitehead contends that all reality is social in nature must be kept in mind in dealing with his definition of religion, if we are not to misunderstand his

meaning. One would expect an emphasis upon the social nature of religion. Whitehead does recognize that the earlier factors in religion were definitely social in every sense of the word. The "primitive phase of religion" which is "dominated by ritual and emotion" is an "essentially social phenomenon." "A collective ritual and a collective emotion" were important "as one of the binding forces of savage tribes."[28]

"At different epochs in history new factors emerge and successively assume decisive importance in their influence on the ascent of the races of mankind."

By the time of Christ, communal religions were "ceasing to be engines of progress. On the whole, they had served humanity well." They had quickened "the sense of social responsibility," and had helped the people to feel 100% tribal.[29]

However they were "religions of the average and the average is at war with the ideal." "A social consciousness concerns people whom you know and love individually,"[30] and it sometimes thwarts the growth of a world consciousness.

The Solitary Nature of Religion

For progress it was necessary to attain to "a wider conscious reaction of men to the universe in which they find themselves"[31] than was found in the older communal religions. This came in with a "purified religion rationalized under the influence of the world concept" in which one studies God's "goodness in order to be like him."[32] It was not until belief and rationalization were "well established that solitariness was "discernable as constituting the heart of religious importance."[33] The coming of rationalism "introduces the note of solitariness" and opens the age of martyrs. "When a modern religion forgets that 'Strait is the gate and narrow is the way....and few there be that find it' it is suffering from an atavistic relapse into primitive barbarism. It is appealing to the psychology of the herd away from the intuitions of the few." The Bible "exhibits the note of progressive solitariness in the religious idea."[34]

Thus Whitehead emphasizes what he calls the solitariness of religion.

> "Religion is the art and the theory of the internal life of man, so far as it depends on the man himself and on what is permanent in the nature of things.

> "This doctrine is the direct negation of the theory that religion is primarily a social fact. Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness. It is the transition from God the void to God the enemy to God the companion.
>
> "Thus religion is solitariness; and if you are never solitary you are never religious. Collective enthusiasms, revivals, institutions, churches, rituals, bibles, codes of behavior, are the trappings of religion, its passing forms. Its good is individual worth of character."[35]

Solitariness and Universality

Superficially this view of Whitehead's as to the solitary nature of religion is directly contradictory to what one would expect from his philosophy. Canon Gore says that "as a definition it is a paradox and indeed so one-sided as to be untrue."[36] And Ames feels that Whitehead has confused "physical solitude with psychological isolation."[37] Without admitting that there is an actual contradiction in Whitehead's system at this point, it is possible that the phraseology in which he defines his idea of religion is somewhat ambiguous, and carries connotations which would not be in line with his philosophy as a whole. Whitehead has been careful to avoid a vocabulary which might be subject to misunderstanding in his more philosophical writings. but

his phraseology in this regard may show vestigial remains of a religious outlook which had not been run through the crucible of his philosophy.

However, Wieman points out that

> "One must be alone in order to discern the principle of concretion which is God and which is operative in all nature, but preeminently in social intercourse, and community of minds."
>
> "The experience itself when deepest and most fruitful comes in solitude ordinarily. That merely means that in order to discern the principle of concretion as it works both in the social world and in the sub-social, one must be free from the jerk and jostle of particular things coming one after another, in order to get some sense of the community and totality of things, and to discern in them that order which is God, which makes each have some share in the existence of all, and all in each."[38]

From this point of view, Whitehead's emphasis upon the solitariness of religion is an attempt to get away from the trees so that one can more clearly see the forest, to disengage oneself from lesser societies so that one can more fully grasp the reality and meaning of the total society. This seems to be on the right path for, for Whitehead, the solitariness of higher religion is based upon its universality.

> "The great rational religions are the outcome of the emergence of a religious consciousness which is universal as distinguished from tribal or even social. Because it is universal, it introduces the note of solitariness. Religion

is what the individual does with his solitariness."

> "The reason for this connection between universality and solitariness is that universality is a disconnection from immediate surroundings. It is an endeavor to find something permanent and intelligible by which to interpret the confusion of immediate detail."[39]

Thus Whitehead opposes the solitariness of religion to its social nature in a smaller sense, so as to emphasize the universality of its social nature. Implied in this is a distinction similar to that of Bergson between Closed Societies and the Open Society, together with Closed Morality and Open Morality.[40] An undue emphasis upon the Closed Society weakens the Open Society. To achieve the open society we must weaken the hold of the Closed Society, and this can be done by emphasizing the individual. Whitehead thus would oppose to the limited religions of nationalism or of the closed churchly group, an individual religion, because that is the way to a religion which shall be universal.

The Bearing of the Organic Nature of the Universe Upon Practical Methods in Religion

The close social interrelatedness of the world as a whole and of the individual entities in it have certain important implications for the methods of Christian teaching. It is true, as Whitehead points out, that it is the individual who is religious. But it is also true, as his philosophy would imply, that the individual is not free from the influence of other individuals, and that this influence may be well nigh overwhelming. This explains certain peculiar phenomena in the religious realm.

For instance, in our missionary activity, we have been thinking of the accepting of a new religion as an individual action. Some of Whitehead's statements would tend to emphasize this view. So we sent our missionaries to foreign countries to "save individual souls." The process seemed almost impossible. One Lutheran group withdrew from Liberia after discovering that it was costing them $55,000 per individual to win the natives to Christianity. Carey was in India many years before he made the first convert. It seemed almost impossible to win one individual by himself. This is what one should expect from the organic relationship between different entities, which is a part of Whitehead's system.

But in face of the constant work of the missionary, changes began to appear in the thought of the surrounding people as a whole. The leaven began to permeate the mass. Many Buddhist hymns are merely Christian hymns re-edited. Not only do eminent Hindus such as Gandhi show marked Christian influences, but there are reform movements in Hinduism such as the Brahmo Samaj which are largely the result of Christian ideas. Then later there has appeared the phenomenon of the mass-movement. In countries in which years had been necessary to win one convert, thousands accept Christianity overnight. It is obvious that these peoples are not thinking nor being converted solely as individuals, but are acting largely as social groups. This phenomenon is inexplicable upon a viewpoint of atomic individualism, but is exactly what one would expect in a world such as Whitehead describes in which each entity prehends more or less directly all the rest of the universe.

Also this social nature of total reality is the foundation for an apologetic for the missionary movement as a whole. In so far as all reality influences every unit of it, it will be impossible, or at least extremely difficult, to have a perfectly Christian man in an un-Christian environment, or to produce a Christian nation in an un-Christian world.

Lincoln said that America could not continue half free and half slave. It is a clear implication of Whitehead's organic nature of the universe that the world cannot continue half-Christian and half-pagan with the division following any geographical national or artificial line. The influence of separate parts of the universe cannot be forced to remain within ~~themselves~~ those parts solely.

This principle would have a bearing upon many other realms. The interrelatedness of the world dooms to failure any attempt to departmentalize it whether in the realm of religion or of morals, or of economic and social life, or of thought.

In the past, we often have actually been using the methods which this theory would suggest even while denying the theory. The Methodist revival depended upon the "class-meeting" in which a group of people were conducted toward higher levels of Christianity together. This has continued for young people in our Christian Endeavors and Epworth Leagues. It has been resurrected in the Oxford Group Movement. Even those who most insistently stress personal, individual salvation have used methods of mass meetings and mass conversion which depended for their efficacy upon the fact that people are not isolated

psychologically one from the other, but actually do much of their thinking and feeling in the mass, with individual reacting upon individual. Society has some of the qualities of an organism.

God as the Source of Organism

The source of the organic interrelatedness of the total universe is God, the Principle of Concretion. He is the Determiner between possibilities.

> "Among the vast variety of possibilities, God eliminates all but the chosen actual which thus becomes concrete."[41]

> "No reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that is the ground of rationality."[42]

Therefore God is the basis for empiricism. He is also the Inherent Nature of All Being. He is not simply "the foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity." Such a conception would "discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all good." He is rather the function of selection in the universe, and "it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominion supreme'."[43]

The universe contains much which is not from God. Also there were many rational possibilities which are not incorporated into the actual world.

> "The general principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason. What further can be known about God must be sought in the region of particular experiences and therefore rests on an empirical basis."[44]

God is the order of the universe. As such, He is the source of its organic character. He so connects its parts that all being is expressed by every particle; it is he that makes it an organism, when he gives actuality to but some of the vast number of possibilities. He is the social bond which packs all being into every particle. He even has a social nature Himself.

But He is not the source of all the universe. Opposed to Him is the principle of evil, which tends to break down the order and the character of interrelatedness which God gives to the world.[45] The "eternal objects" also are principles, but they are subordinate to God, and through them He gives form to the world.

But despite these lesser principles, and also the opposing principle of evil, God must be spoken of as the inherent nature of all being. He is immanent in all being.

He is not an external agent but is an internal ordering agency. He so orders the universe that each fragment of it is closely connected with and dependent upon every other fragment. He "is that actual entity from which each temporal concresence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts."[46] God's action is not static. He pushes the Whole on toward the incarnation of the Order of Values which He is in the permanent aspects of His being, and especially toward integration and the closest of interrelatedness. "Decay, transition, loss, displacement belong to the essence of this Creative Advance."[47] God is beauty; God is love: God is the everlasting arm which sustains both human life and the world.[48] That God is love is obvious because both love and God ~~is~~ ARE the "ordering of all being" so that "it can enter most fully into the existence of every particular thing."[49]

In so far as God is of this nature, man also finds his highest good in becoming like God, a creature which "prehends" most fully. Good is the direction of greater integration, of a fuller order, of a closer interrelatedness. Evil is that which breaks down these social bonds. Man is highest in so far as he has ties which are close with a greater number of entities, and is most nearly representative

of the universe as a whole. God, the Principle of Concretion thus has two foci. He creates actuality by limiting possibility. He so limits that He makes each particle dependent for its nature upon what the rest of the world is. The Principle of Concretion is the source of that organic structure of the universe which causes all being to come to a focus in each particular. It is He that packs the nature of God and of man into Tennyson's little flower in the crannied wall.[50] It is because of the nature of God that environment is so influential in its effects upon individual particulars. They prehend their environment and God packs their environment into them.

A Criticism of Cosmic Gods

Whitehead's use of the word 'God' for the 'Principle of Concretion' has been severely criticized. Primarily such a God is a necessity for philosophy. "God as the Principle of Concretion" is required "in the place of Aristotle's God as Prime Mover."[51] If there were no God, there would be no actuality, but only formless creativity and abstract forms, both powerless to actualize themselves in a concrete world. Thus God is needed as the "ground for

concrete actuality." But God as the Principle of Concretion not only corresponds with God the Prime Mover of the Aristotelian system, but also with God the Creator in the Christian theologies. It has sometimes been objected that this is the wrong God. This is partially true. A cosmic God is a necessity for thought, rather than the object of religious experience. But it is also true that the Creator idea enriches the idea of the moral imperative, and the more fully religious ideas of God. Whitehead would not claim that a cosmological concept of God is adequate for the purposes of religion, but he would claim that the cosmological idea of God is necessary to give religion its greatest power. He insists that religion must have a metaphysic and must ground itself upon the empirical actualities of the universe.

A cosmological conception of God which emphasizes his social nature, and his activity in making social the lesser entities of the organic universe which He directs forms an especially good background for the religious quality of love. Love must be the good, in a world in which closeness of inter-relatedness is to be sought as a part of that integration which is God's purpose for the world.

In Whitehead's system, God, the Principle of Concretion,

is the "destiny that makes us brothers." All individual persons are members of One whole presided over by God, and "where one member suffereth, all the members suffer with it." God as the source of the social bond is the quality in the universe which makes love natural, and in line with the character of reality as a whole. This finding of something analogous to love at the centre of the universe is important. It is theoretically possible for a man's religion to be entirely distinct from his conception of the nature of reality. Practically it is impossible to keep them apart. Even the Communist when hard pressed is likely to bang his fist on the table, and state that there is something in the nature of the universe which makes for the victory of the Communist ideal. Men like to feel that even the stars fight in their courses for their ideal of the good. Whitehead places at the centre of the universe the source of an organic quality, which makes for the victory of Love. The essence of Whitehead's Principle of Concretion is love, and we love because God first loved us.

The criticism has been made that Whitehead sets up a conception of an impersonal cosmic orderer as God, the Principle of Concretion, and then proceeds to attribute to it, without evidence, the qualities of the personal God of religious experience. This criticism grows out of the

fact that Whitehead lays almost all his emphasis upon God the Principle of Concretion, and there is nothing in this conception which is necessarily personal. However God the Principle of Concretion is a part of the primordial nature of a God, which also has a Consequent Nature, and this Consequent Nature of God does have qualities which are personal, such asconsciousness and purpose. In fact Whitehead extends qualities parallel to these, far down on the organic scale. The use of personal terms in dealing with the more nearly impersonal aspects of the Divine Being can only be justified by reason of a unity of these impersonal aspects with the Consequent Nature of God which does have the personal qualities of consciousness and purpose.

The Principle of Concretion and The Logos

Conceived thus, God the Principle of Concretion, has a closely analogous character with the Logos of Greek thought and of Johannine theology.[52] It finds its origin in the transcendent and permanent elements of God's nature and is itself an aspect of God's total nature. Through it, all things come into being, and receive their character. Because each entity is a microcosm, the nature of this con-

stituent order is revealed partially in every actuality, and especially in an organism of a high level such as human beings. Thus each human being can rightly be viewed as a partial incarnation of the Principle of Concretion.

In dealing with Jesus, Whitehead recognizes that his life revealed certain aspects of the nature of reality, such as the tender elements in the world.[53] There is no reason to believe that Whitehead would agree that the Principle of Concretion ever was so completely incarnated in any one life, that we could say that it became flesh, and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth, and yet we find in his system the same idea that something of the innate nature of the universe is packed into each human being, which underlay the Johannine doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ.

Whitehead's doctrine of the Principle of Concretion does not necessarily include, but it also does not necessarily conflict with the highest conception of the nature of the personality of Jesus.

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3. MacMurray, J., "Objectivity in Religion" in Adventure by Streeter and Others, p. 185.
4. Science and the Modern World, p. 206.
5. Process and Reality, p. 471.
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7. Ibid, p. 24.
8. Ibid, p. 25.
9. Sellars, Religion Coming of Age, p. 12.
10. Introduction to Mathematics, p. 119.
11. Religion in the Making, p. 108.
12. Wieman, H. N., Wrestle of Religion With Truth, p. 190.
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19. Science and the Modern World, p. 111.
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22. Function of Reason, p. 9.

23. Ibid, p. 11.

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25. Science and the Modern World, p. 111.

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37. Ames, E. S., Religion, p. 39.

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40. Bergson, Henri, The Two Sources of Morality and of Religion.

41. Science and the Modern World, p. 251.

42. Ibid, p. 249.

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45. Wieman, H. N., Wrestle of Religion With Truth, p. 189.

46. Process and Reality, p. 34, 38.

47. Emmet, D. M., A Review of Adventures of Ideas. Hibbert Journal, Vol. 32, p. 181.

48. Wieman, H. N., Wrestle of Religion With Truth, p. 200.

49. Ibid, p. 199.

50. Ibid, p. 181.

51. Science and the Modern World, p. 243.

52. Buckham, J. W., The Humanity of God, p. 22n. Dr. Buckham says that "nothing could be more strikingly, though unintentionally, interpretative and corroborative of the Logos conception than Professor Whitehead's 'Principle of Concretion'."

53. Process and Reality, p. 520.

V

HUMAN PERSONALITY

The Organic Character of the Human Being

The human personality has an organic character, because it is the inherent nature of the whole of the human being, which is an organism. Or rather the human being is an organism of organisms. On the physical side, the fact that a human being is an organism of organisms is obvious. Each separate cell in the body is also a lesser organism corresponding in some ways to unicellular forms of life such as the amoeba. Even these cells are organisms of organisms for they consist of molecules which again are organic in character. The human organism is a part of a greater organism of organisms in the universe as a whole. The universe is thus a series of microcosms in macrocosm.

Personality as a Relationship

In this system, personality appears to be a relationship, or rather a complex set of relationships. The ultimately smallest units of reality are "event particles." "We must not think of the world as ultimately built up of

event-particles. That is to put the cart before the horse."[1] The greater cannot be understood from the lesser. The lesser is to be understood from the greater. In an organic universe, "wholes can determine parts as well as parts wholes."[2] Now the human personality is that element in the human organism which makes a man more than both the sum of his individual cells, and the sum of the various events in his stream of consciousness. Thus if one is to abstract the personality out of the total organism, it will be seen that personality must be of the nature of a relationship or complex of relationships. Personality is that which relates the various events in the stream of consciousness, and the various events which go to make up the physical side of the human organism.

In Whitehead's system, neither the word "abstract" or the making of personality a "series of relationships" denies to it reality, as it would in a materialistic system. In Whitehead's system qualities are just as real as objects; relationships are more real than matter. In the older systems in which material substances extended in space were conceived as the only real, personality had to partake of their nature, being a static thinking substance which was not extended in space, in order to be

real. In a system in which we are free from the materialistic conception of matter, we can be free enough from the materialistic conception of reality to rid ourselves of an essentially materialistic conception of the soul. Thus the personality is real but it is a reality which partakes more of the nature of relationships or of form than of substance. It is a very peculiar and important type of relationship or rather series of relationships. It has some unexpected qualities. It sometimes seems to transcend the relationships. Yet in part at least, the human personality is "a generic relation between occasions of human experience."

The fact that personality is something that relates events in the stream of consciousness is brought out by certain abnormal psychological arrangements in which what is normally one integrated set of relationships disintegrates into the dual or even the triple personality. Something similar to this seems to appear in amnesia. Normally these relationships should be integrated into one unity.

The Fact of Personal Unity

Although human personality has thus been attenuated into "a generic relation between occasions of human experience, yet personal unity is an unescapable fact." There must be some "fact to be accounted for" to explain the various doctrines of the soul, thinking substance, and "the general common sense of civilized mankind." "Any philosophy must provide some doctrine of personal identity. In some sense there is a unity in the life of each man, from birth to death." When Whitehead, like Hume and William James, rejects "the notion of a self-identical Soul-Substance," he has the problem of providing "an adequate account of this undoubted personal unity, maintaining itself amid the welter of circumstance."[3]

Whitehead finds the outline of "a general description of this personal unity" divested of the "minor details of humanity" in Plato's doctrine of the Receptacle or Locus in the Timeans. He does not find it in Plato's doctrine of the soul.

"A third term, personal unity" is required "in addition to the notions of the welter of events, and of the forms which they illustrate." This concept is difficult. It is "perplexed and obscure." It is "the receptacle,

the foster mother....of the becoming of our occasions of experience. This personal identity is the thing which receives all occasions of the man's existence. It is there as a natural matrix for all transitions of life." "It differs in its character at different times" because it "is changed and variously figured by the things that enter it." "It must itself be bare of all forms," "since it receives all manner of experiences into its own unity." It is "invisible, formless, and all receptive. It is a locus which persists, and provides an emplacement for all the occasions of experience." It has a unity with its own past, and has ideals. All "that which happens in it is conditioned by the compulsion of its own past, and by the persuasion of its immanent ideals."[4]

Whitehead says that the sole function of this Locus, Receptacle, or personal unity "is the imposition of a unity upon the events of Nature. These events are together by reason of their community of locus." It seems to give them actuality by reason of emplacement within this community."

This description of personal unity does not pertain to human beings alone. It "is at once the doctrine of the unity of nature, and of the unity of each human life." Thus the unity of the human personality and of the universe is of the same kind. "The conclusion follows that our

consciousness of the self-identity pervading our life-thread of occasions, is nothing other than knowledge of a special strand of unity within the general unity of nature." Thus as one would expect from the general character of a world of organic microcosms within organic macrocosms, the unity of the human personality is a unity within a larger whole. "It is a locus within the Whole, marked out by its own peculiarities, but otherwise exhibiting the general principles which guide the constitution of the whole." "The Whole determines the parts, as well as the parts determining the Whole." Whitehead comments that "this general principle is the object-to-subject structure of experience. It can be otherwise stated as the vector structure of nature." It is a doctrine of the immanence of the Whole in the part, and of the past in the present. "It can be conceived as the doctrine of the immanence of the past energizing in the present." Memory in the human being corresponds to this similar quality in the universe as a whole. Whitehead finds this doctrine although applied only to the unity of nature, in the Platonic Dialogues. Also, "this doctrine of immanence is practically that doctrine adumbrated by the Hellenistic Christian theologians of Egypt. But they applied the doctrine only to the

relation of God to the world, and not to all actualities."[5]

Thus Personality is a unified relation between occasions and events.

Dr. Buckham feels that Professor Whitehead cannot be regarded "as affording an adequate evaluation of personality with his account of a person as "a genetic relation between occasions of human experience," although he grants that "personal unity is an inescapable fact."[6]

It would appear that Professor Whitehead is right that personality is "a genetic relation between occasions of human experience," and that Dr. Buckham is also right in saying that this is not an adequate description of personality. It would appear that although personality is a complex of relationships, it is relationships with such peculiar emergent qualities that there should be posited some transcendent element in personality, such as that posited for God in his permanent nature as an order of values. However it may be that the transcendent elements which seem to be implied by the peculiar qualities of the complex of relationships which we call personality find their being in the nature of God, for, as we have seen, the human personality is a lesser strand of unity in a greater unity of Nature which must find its origin in God.

Man's unity being thus a part in the greater unity makes man a microcosm, which, as an organism, is lesser than, but is similar to, the total organism of the universe. Thus it would appear that human personality might, not only be thought of as a unified set of relationships, but also as a dynamic 'relator' analogous to the Principle of Concretion or God of the universe as a whole. Whether we would thus be warranted in speaking of the human personality as a "Relator" or not, it is obvious that the human personality is both a dynamic and a unified complex of relationships.

Personal idealists have commonly emphasized some such transcendent element in personality.[7] Whitehead seems to ignore the transcendent element and to limit his attention to that aspect of personality which we can know through its immanence in the world. It may be that both aspects are necessary for an adequate understanding of the nature of personality.

The fact that Whitehead holds that personality is a matter of relationships, ignoring as he does any transcendent elements which may be implied by these relationships, may have far reaching implications for religion. It may provide the key for the synthesis of the truths for

which naturalistic philosophers have stood with some of the truths upon which personalists and other religious thinkers have insisted. Whitehead believes that personality is a "generic relationship" but he also insists that relationships and other so-called abstract qualities of experience are real, and are neither illusions, nor products of the human mind.

Now if personality is a relationship, the spiritual, which is the realm of the personal, must also be a matter of relationships. God and the spiritual cannot be placed in juxtaposition to men and matter. They are not a more rarefied kind of matter separated from the matter of Nature. On the contrary, they belong rather to the order of relationships and of form, and cannot be separated, except in thought from the other aspects of reality.

Now this idea that God and the spiritual are matters of relationship would be acceptable to other realists. The older naturalists seemed to sense this quality of the spiritual and therefore denied to it any real existence. For them "abstract" qualities, and relationships were "psychic additions" with no reality of their own. On the other hand, Christian thinkers often seemed to agree sufficiently with the idea that "abstract" qualities and

relationships were less real than material objects, that they materialized their conceptions of the spiritual. They were so certain that personality and the spiritual are real, that in order to safeguard this reality, they conceived personality and the spiritual in terms analogous to objects and matter.

Without claiming that Whitehead does justice to the transcendent elements implied in the peculiar qualities of personality it should be noted that his system contains a synthesis of the essential points of view of both the older naturalists, and many of the older religionists. He recognizes that God, man, and the spiritual, in so far as they are immanent in the universe, belong essentially to the realm of relationships, and of what has formerly been called the abstract but his philosophic system is of such a nature that this does not injure their reality. He also does not find it necessary to deny their distinctive qualities.

There is an emergent element in personality in its ability to think, feel, be conscious and have purposes, which transcends the qualities of other kinds of relationship. These qualities of personality also transcend those of any other entity. They are so peculiar that the older

naturalists denied that personality could exist. They are so far transcendent that the older religionists denied that personality was a matter of relationships at all. They retained the distinctive qualities, but placed them within a world which was distinct from the only one that we know.

Whitehead is more inclined to accept the empirical world as he finds it, than were either of these older groups. For him, the spiritual and personal are a matter of relationships. They are also real. It is not necessary to deny their distinctive characteristics. He recognizes that emergent elements in actuality do occur. But it cannot be said that he deals adequately with the transcendent elements which these emergent elements must imply. These transcendent elements of personality cannot be adequately known from without, but if they are to be known, must be studied from within the personality. For instance we have a direct intuition of our own freedom. Perhaps a study of the internal life of man would show other direct intuitions.

The Freedom of Man

Is the human personality actually free? The fact that the unity of the human personality is of the same nature as that of the whole may have an important bearing upon this question. In the universe as a whole, Whitehead finds a place for creativity and freedom.

> "However far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of the components of a concresence.....beyond the determination of these components there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe..... The doctrine is that each concresence is to be referred to a definite free initiation, and a definite free conclusion. The initial fact is macrocosmic in the sense of having equal relevance to all occasions; the final fact is microcosmic, in the sense of being peculiar to that occasion."[8]

In this Whitehead seems to extend the potentiality of God to each minute particle. There is no reason why this should not be done. Freedom need not be limited to God and man, but may be distributed throughout the universe. Heisenberg's Principle of Indeterminacy suggests that contingency is found in the movements of the most minute particles of the universe. The freedom of man, or of lesser particles of reality would not be in opposition to that of God, but would be part of the total freedom of God, just as any freedom which belongs to any cell of the human body

is a part of the total freedom of the man himself.

Moore has felt that this quality of potentiality must be limited to the whole. He says that any contingency in the component parts of an organism would disrupt its organic character.[9]

It is obviously true that the organic character of the whole would limit the kinds of contingency which would be possible in the parts. It does not appear that it would necessarily preclude every type of contingency. There is no reason why the lesser organisms should not be partially free, and also be partially determined by the fact of being parts of a greater organism which determines its parts. This seems to be the empirical situation.

It is possible that such a situation as Moore fears actually does arise. Whitehead speaks of evil as a partial purpose in conflict with the greater purpose. In an human organism, a cancer is a group of cells, which continue to grow without any thought of the needs of the organism as a whole. In society also there often grow up parasitic groups which seem to oppose the onward movement of God in history. However it is not necessary for partial purposes to take a form which will disrupt the organic unity. The nature of the greater organism can set limits to the

exercise of freedom by the lesser organism.

Human freedom, at any one point in time, will be limited further by the character of the personality as determined by its own past history which will be immanent in it. The choices which may be made today are limited by those which were made in the past. Thus the individual can be said to make himself.

Despite these limitations it seems to be an empirical fact that human beings do seem to have purpose and freedom. Even "a lost dog can be seen trying to find his master, or trying to find his way home. In fact we are directly conscious of our purposes as directive of our actions."[10] Human freedom is an empirical fact in the world.

The Relationship of Personality to Its Environment

It is somewhat of an abstraction to separate personality from the more material elements in the human organism, or even from its outer physical environment. In personality, Whitehead believes that the physical forms an essential base for the spiritual and mental. In the abstraction of thought, we set up a dualistic view of the human organism, but in reality, the body and the mind are always discovered

as one empirical unity, with the parts interacting the one upon the other.

> "The body pollutes the mind, the mind pollutes the body. Physical energy sublimates itself into zeal; conversely zeal stimulates the body. The biological ends pass into ideals.....and the formation of standards affects the biological facts."[11]

Thus the mind cannot be separated from the body that carries it. Likewise the combined Self of body and mind cannot be separated sharply from its surroundings. "There is a unity of the body with the environment as well as a unity of body and soul into one person."[12]

Bearing of This Relationship Upon the Philosophy of History

This unity of the mind, body, and environment has certain important practical and theoretical applications. Thus in Whitehead's philosophy of history, which is found mainly in "~~The~~ Adventures of Ideas," Whitehead emphasizes the influence of ideas. The human personality is able to respond to Ideals such as the Christian idea of brotherhood. But man is a unity. As such he is a being that is both physical and psychical. To claim that his behavior either singly or en masse is purely a function of one of these elements is an abstraction. Whitehead's interest is in

the importance, and influence of ideas, but he does not ignore the economic interpretation of history. This is the natural implication of the fact that man is a physical being with physical needs. The reason that the importance of material things in history was not recognized earlier was because writers commonly came from the privileged groups for whom the pressure of economic and material wants did not exist, but for the mass of people, economic pressure is constantly active. It is ridiculous to ask a person to make fine distinctions in food, when they have great difficulty in merely filling their stomachs. Similarly, it has not been found possible to interest in spiritual and ideal objects, those who have a constant struggle to achieve material wellbeing.

Here is the reason that religion must have an interest in social and economic facts. If human personality did exist in a vacuum, it would be legitimate to treat it as an entity with no connections with its environment. But with the kind of human personality which actually is existent, it is necessary to take into consideration all parts of the human unity together with its environment. The world is not a vacuum. In the past sin has too often been an abstraction with very little relation to the real evil which is found in an actual world of interrelatedness. The soul

has too often been an abstraction with but very little relationship with the real personality, which has physical as well as spiritual elements, and which is always closely related to its environment. Salvation has too often been an abstraction far removed from the realities of the attempt to help human beings to a higher life in an actual world. In the past, philosophy and theology have often been curses to real religion, because they took religion so far from the actualities of the world, that it absolutely lost all connection with them. It was not real. It was an abstraction. For the needs of real men in a real world, abstract religion and abstract theology are not adequate.

One of the major implications of Whitehead's philosophy for religion is that we must return from this world of abstraction to the real man, who is partly physical, and who is interrelated in myriads of ways with a real world, which is partly physical also. The lowly Salvation Army has been on the right track with its emphasis upon the need for physical salvation as well as for spiritual. In every way religion should attempt to remain close to the empirically real.

Whitehead's philosophy of history has another appli-

cation. His acceptance of both the ideological and the materialistic interpretation of history is an integral part of the system that accepts the essential unity of the mental and physical elements in a Self. He claims that progress comes when both the Ideals of those, who are freed from economic pressure, and the economic pressure on those who bear its brunt are pushing in the same direction. He seems to feel that at any one moment of time, the economic element is the stronger, but that in the long run, it is the silent and eternal pressure of the Ideal that moulds itself lastingly into the world.

Now it is the Ideal that especially pertains to religion. But if progress always comes as the result of the coordinated effects both of the Ideal, and of economic pressures, then those who are religious and the supporters of the Ideal will not fear cooperation with those whose actuating motives spring from the pressure of material needs and desires, if the end, which both desire, is the same. Two can walk together when they have agreed upon the destination and the route, even though their reasons for wishing to go vary. In the long run, the Ideal, which is eternal, will stamp itself on the universe by the help of a great many economic and social movements, which are but temporal.

The Individual and Society

The human being is a unified individual. As we have seen, the human personality represents a strand of unity in the greater unity of the universe, and this lesser strand has purpose, freedom, and the ability actively to build itself. The individual is not cut off sharply from the rest of the world. The idea that personality is an individual sharply delimited from other individualities is an abstraction or even a myth. It is an example of what Whitehead calls misplaced concreteness. "What we know and do is a living fragment whose fibres and tendrils stretch out into an immensity beyond."[13] Like Faraday's electric charge, the human personality is not strictly limited to one point in space-time, but can truly be said to be everywhere.[14]

Because of this quality of the Self it, like all other forms of being, has an importance stretching far beyond that which is near or present. The Self is not, and cannot be an idle wheel in nature. To change, damage, or destroy one electron, to say nothing of one Self is to change the universe as a whole. The Christian doctrine of the worthfulness of the Self fits right into Whitehead's system. In it even the hairs of our head are literally

numbered.

Immortality is not a necessary implication of Whitehead's system. The worth of the Self may still be retained, even though the Self does not have infinity of extension in the time ordinate of space-time. It may have such infinity of extension also in the other ordinates. The Self is a strand of unity in a greater Whole and this whole is immortal. Therefore, the Self also may be immortal. Immortality is a fact that can be arrived at only on a basis of empirical evidence. In the realm of possibilities, it can be either true or not true. The immortality of the Self thus would rest upon the nature of God. If the human Self is immortal, it would appear that it must be able to find a greater freedom from the material than it does in the part of actuality which we know. If it had such a quality, it would have to be similar to the "eternal objects" which although ingredient into actual events, also transcend the world of actuality.

The Self is not static. It grows and develops. Its past is immanent in its present, and it moves toward the future. Religious faith is important in this growth of the Self: "your character is developed according to your faith."[15] Whitehead even defines religion in light of its

influence upon the development of character.

> "A religion on its doctrinal side can thus be defined as a system of general truths which have the effect of transforming character when they are sincerely held and vividly apprehended. In the long run your character and your conduct of life depend upon your ultimate convictions."[16]

Religion is one of the ties between the individual organism and the great organism of which it is a part.

The unity of the Self with the Universe has an epistemological importance. Whitehead believes that this unity is the explanation of our knowledge of that universe. What we experience in knowing is a particular instance of a much larger type of relationship in nature. "The object-to-subject structure of human experience is reproduced in physical nature by this vector relation of particular to particular."[17] The mind cannot get outside itself in order to know the wholly other. If "subjects with private worlds of experience.....be granted, there is no escape from solipsism."

There is a need for balance as between the individual and the social. There are two truths. The Self is both an individual centre of unity, and a part in a greater whole. The philosophy of organism makes an organic place for both these truths. The individual Self is analogous in its relationship to the whole to the relation of the individual

cell in a body to the total animal. It is both an individual organism of its own right, and at the same time, a fragment in the total organic unity of the universe as a whole. As such it has a social bond with all other parts of that greater organism. It is important that neither of these two truths be neglected. In the philosophy of organism there is a place for both the One and the Many. In many philosophic systems, there is a strong temptation to emphasize one of them at the expense of the other. The omission of either one of these elements, which are always found together in reality, is an abstraction which causes important defects in the practical concerns of life, witness our own "rugged individualism" on the one hand, and the Fascist "Totalitarian State" on the other. It should always be remembered that there is an individual, which is always part of a social whole. "The individual is formative of the society, the society is formative of the individual."[18]

It should be noted that, for Whitehead, the organism of which individual persons, are parts, is not the State, but the universe as a whole. It is probable that he would not accept the State as an organism at all. The modern State is more nearly a confused aggregate of individuals. Each individual has tendrils which reach far beyond the boundaries

of the state. Anything less than humanity as a whole is very inadequate as the higher organism. Actually it is even greater than that, namely the total universe. Whitehead's insistence upon the solitary nature of religion was to avoid the pit-falls of stressing the closed-society of the tribe, nation, or state, by emphasizing the direct relationship of the solitary individual to the universal which far transcends any human state. Whitehead believes that tribal religion of the type of which Shintoism, Fascism, and religious nationalism are recrudescences was at one time valuable, but that it had already outlived its usefulness by the time of Christ. These throwbacks to the type of religion which was universal prior to Amos, in so far as they thwart the integration of humanity as a whole, and of man with the universal, must now be reckoned among the forces of evil. Edith Cavell was right. "Patriotism is not enough." There must also be a place for the higher loyalty.

The Personality of Jesus

In this description of personality, that of Jesus as well as those of other human beings would be a strand of unity within the greater unity of nature as a whole. Whitehead gives no suggestion that the personality of

Jesus differed in kind from that of other human personalities. However he does feel that certain entities prehend more closely than other entities. Thus if there is empirical or other evidence for such a view there is nothing in Whitehead's system which would necessarily deny that the personality of Jesus had the fullest degree of interrelatedness with other men, and with the universe as a whole, that would be possible for one of these lesser strands of unity, and thus that Jesus might rightly be spoken of as the Ideal personality.

Whitehead's approach to personality is almost entirely external. This is quite distinct from the approach of most of those who have emphasized personality, for they have usually approached the problem from the study of the inner self consciousness of the personalities that we know. Although Whitehead's system is not personalistic, it does not necessarily conflict with the essential truths which personalistic philosophies have emphasized. It is merely some of the superficial and unimportant aspects of older views of personality, which are no longer adequate, and must be changed.

NOTES

Chapter V

1. Concept of Nature, p. 172.

2. Lyman, Meaning and Truth of Religion, p. 275.

3. Whitehead, Objects and Subjects. Philosophical Review,, Vol. 41, p. 141. March 1932.

4. Ibid, p. 142.

5. Ibid, p. 143.

6. Buckham, Christianity and Personality, p. 9--note.

7. Ibid, p. 164.

8. Process and Reality, pp. 75, 76.

9. Moore, M. H., Mr. Whitehead's Philosophy. Philosophical Review, Vol. 40, p. 267. March 1931.

10. Nature and Life, p. 2.

11. Religion in the Making, p. 87.

12. Nature and Life, p. 4.

13. Introduction to Mathematics.

14. Concept of Nature, p. 146.

15. Religion in the Making, p. 14.

16. Ibid, p. 15.

17. Whitehead, Objects and Subjects. Philosophical Review, Vol. 41, p. 131. March 1932.

18. Religion in the Making, p. 87.

VI

THE DIVINE PERSONALITY

The Consequent Nature of God

God also is a person. The existence of God is a necessity for thought as well as for the needs of the religious life, but it is a somewhat different God. We have already dealt with the God of philosophy in our study of permanence and organization in the world. Whitehead calls this the Primordial Nature of God. It lays down the conditions under which becoming can take place. The actual process of developing into the richest possible world is dominated by an urge which Whitehead calls the Consequent Nature of God.

> "The nature of God is dipolar. He has a primordial nature and a consequent nature. The consequent nature of God is conscious; and it is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature and through the transformation of his wisdom."[1]

Seemingly only the Consequent Nature is conscious. Of course the division into two natures belongs rather to our thinking than necessarily to the nature of God himself.[2] It is the Consequent Nature of God which has direct religious meaning.

> "He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage."[3]

This Consequent Nature of God is a growing one. In this aspect, "God's nature is ever enlarging itself." At any present, the Consequent Nature is incomplete. It "originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, consequent, 'everlasting', fully actual and conscious." It is through this growth of God into the world "that the immediacy of sorrow and pain is transformed into an element of triumph. This is the notion of redemption through suffering which haunts the world."[4]

For the purposes of religion, we must understand this Consequent Nature of God. To learn what God is, we must look to the world-process. Whitehead has no intention that the idea of God should explain the world process. However there is no reason why the God, who dwells in the process, and is both conscious, and purposeful, should not be conceived of as transcending the process in his conscious purpose. The emergence of this transcendent purpose into the actual process in time would be the creation

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of that which is entirely new. "Emergent evolution is the expression of divine activity, which alone gives the determinate plan of events, and is to be conceived as omnipotent and manifested in every one of the multitudinous entities within the scheme."[5]

Whitehead makes no place for the old distinction of natural and supernatural, nor for the miraculous, except as the normal expression of the nature of the universe, in all its parts. He feels that the whole world-process is so fully within the divine purpose that no part of it can rightfully be singled out as an act of God. "God, if in any is in all, without distinction of entities."[6] All the good and order in the world is an act of God.

Whitehead would thus probably agree that all things are 'working together for good' as parts of God's providence. It has seemed very difficult to many to reconcile the Providence of God with Human Freedom. The solution of this problem may be helped by Whitehead's doctrine of the vast number of possibilities out of which the Principle of Concretion selects those to be made actual. We speak of God as having a perfect plan both for each human life and for the world. In the presence of so many possibilities almost any combination which had

occurred up to any one point of time might easily be the first part of a whole in the realm of possibilities which might well be called perfect. That is, God would be able to use even the seeming evil to carry out his plans.[7] The reconciliation of Freedom and Providence in a world of order is made easier by the fact that God can wait. Whitehead conceives him as a persuasive power which slowly bends all things into accordance with his will, merely by waiting and holding his Ideals before them, until they freely choose that which advances this plan. God intervenes, not in terms of force but in terms of persuasion.[8]

God "does not create the world." "He saves the world."[9] There is a sense in which the process exists without God, and in which the world can be said to be self-creative, but if left to itself the various processes in the world-process would conflict. God is a persuasive power, which works to have these other powers work cooperatively. In a world which would be a great discord if left to itself, God saves from discord by leading to the vision of the possible order and beauty.

In the long run, this intelligent and persuasive power will win over force. We, in so far as we are intelligent and guided by a worthy idealism, may help.

Because God is thus a persuasive element rather than a brute force or power, it will be discovered that democracy is more nearly in line with the nature of the universe than is Fascism, dictatorship, or any other social entity which finds its motive power in force.

This idea that the creative element is a persuasive one is not new to Whitehead. It was a part of Platonism and also of Christianity.[10] It is a doctrine of Grace of which the life of Jesus was the best exemplification.[11] Civilization is the result of the victory of persuasion over force.[12]

The Movement of God in History

Whitehead's idea of God as a persuasive power ties up with his philosophy of history which is given mainly in the "Adventures of Ideas." The first part of this book which traces the effect of certain Christian and Platonic ideas in the development of civilization is of especial interest to us. He says that we are still divided on all the matters over which the ancients argued, but that on the one matter on which they all agreed, namely the necessity of slavery, we are agreed that they were mistaken,

and he traces this change of viewpoint to the Christian ideal of brotherhood. Progress is a matter of gradual growth. It takes place when there is a coordinated effect of the Ideals, which come from our vision of God, and of the economic pressures evolved in the self-creation of the world. Whitehead emphasizes the importance of ideas, but he also recognizes the overwhelming importance of the materialistic elements in history. At any one time the economic element is the stronger, but in the long run, the silent pressure of ideals moulds the world to its pattern.

Whitehead claims that a great idea is not to be conceived as merely waiting for enough good men to carry it into practical effect. That is a childish view of the history of ideas. The ideal in the background is promoting the gradual growth of the requisite communal customs adequate to sustain the load of its exemplification.

Whitehead sees a close analogy between the position of Christianity in the ancient world and of Communism in the world of today. Both had or have ideals which cannot possibly be fitted into the social order in which they live, without great changes; changes which would appear utterly subversive and destructive. If a man of the ancient

world had been asked what would be the result of the abolition of slavery, his answer would be (however good and kindly he was personally) that such action would be impossible, as it would destroy the whole basis of civilization. Yet Whitehead feels that the silent pressure of Christian ideals of brotherhood through the centuries has been a large factor in abolishing slavery.

This philosophy of history is an integral part of the thought system which makes a place for God as a persuasive power. It sees the Consequent Nature of God incarnating Himself into the stream of history through the constant pressure of ideals. As Dr. Buckham has pointed out, a great idea not only has "a creative power, making possible its own approach to realization,"[13] but its existence "inevitably carries the human mind beyond itself to a more comprehensive mind,"[14] which must be its source. Whitehead does not definitely tie up his philosophy of history with his conception of the Consequent Nature of God in the'Adventures of Ideas' and yet the two are obviously integral parts of the same thought system.

Whitehead's Conception and Pantheism

Whitehead's conception of God is not pantheistic. The idea of God is the most important element in a religion. Historically, there have been three simple ideas of the God of religion.

> "In Eastern Asia, God is commonly thought of as an impersonal order to which the world conforms. This order is the self-ordering of the world; it is not the world obeying an imposed rule. The concept expresses the extreme doctrine of immanence."[15]

Secondly,

> "The Semites conceived God as a definite personal individual entity, whose existence is the one ultimate metaphysical fact, absolute and underivative, who decreed and ordered the derivative existence which we call the actual world. This Semitic concept is the rationalization of the tribal gods of earlier communal religions. It expresses the extreme doctrine of transcendence."[16]

In the third place, there is what Whitehead calls the Pantheistic concept. By this name he refers to the

> "concept of an entity to be described in the terms of the Semitic concept, except that the actual world is a phase within the complete fact, which is this ultimate individual entity. The actual world conceived apart from God is unreal. Its only reality is God's reality. The actual world has the reality of being a partial description of what God is. But in itself it is merely a certain mutuality of 'appearances' which is a phase of the being of God. This is the extreme doctrine of Monism."[17]

None of these simple ideas is adequate. The idea of God is a very complex one, and it is difficult to fit it into any simple philosophical system. Thus in the case of the Semitic concept, one "may discover an immanent God but not a God wholly transcendent."[18] A more searching analysis is necessary.

Christianity has been eclectic in its idea of God. It "has not adopted any one of these clear alternatives. Starting from the forms of speech of the Semitic, it also includes the immanent." In this Christianity has been right. "The three extremes of simple notions should not represent in our eyes mutually exclusive concepts, from among which we are to choose one, and reject the other."

However, "it cannot be true that contradictory notions can apply to the same fact. Thus reconcilement of these contrary concepts must be sought in a more searching analysis of the meaning of the terms in which they are phrased."[19]

There has commonly been a tendency for philosophical interpretations of the doctrine of God to look in the direction of pantheism. Whitehead is not a pantheist. He does not hold that God and the world are the same. God, on the one hand, is less than the universe, in that

he is merely one element or quality in the universe, that of order and concretion, and, on the other hand, he is more than the actual universe, because he also includes the ideal forms together with an order of valuation among them. He also does not include evil, which is an opposing principle, which breaks down the aesthetic order of the world. God is related to all other entities, and is the source of their quality of interrelatedness. Evil breaks down this quality of interrelatedness. God and evil are thus opposites, and the one does not include the other.

God is limited in Whitehead's system. The old doctrine of omnipotence was a mistake.

> "The Church gave unto God the attributes which belonged exclusively to Caesar. God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles involved to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification. To be an actual thing is to be limited.[20]

"The limitation of God is his goodness. He gains his depth of actuality by his harmony of valuation. It is not true that God is in all respects infinite. If he were He would be evil as well as good."[21]

The moral order is inherent in the nature of God as He stands in opposition to evil. However it is difficult

to invent a simple philosophic system which finds a place for the facts of morality and evil. "All simplifications of religious dogma are shipwrecked upon the rock of the problem of evil."[22] "If the theory of complete determinism, by reason of the necessity of conformation with the nature of God holds true, then the evil in the world is in conformity with the nature of God."[23] But God and value are opposed to evil. God and value belong together. "The purpose of God is the attainment of value in the temporal world." Evil thwarts this purpose.

The Problem of Evil

Thus, the problem of evil is the great obstruction to the triumph and adequacy of many conceptions of God. It will not fit into a simple conception of God. Evil is not primarily a result of the frustration of human needs and desires. They experience it, and know it, but evil itself is a positive force in the universe, which would exist even if there were no human beings to experience it. The ultimate norm of good and evil is not man, but the divine ordering of the universe.

Integration thus becomes the norm. The universe is

one in which each part "prehends" all the rest. Its purpose and direction is toward an even fuller interrelatedness.

Evil is that which destroys integration. The degree of relatedness which various objects have with others varies. In this regard the inanimate is lower than the vegetable, which again is lower than the animal. Earthly interrelatedness finds its climax in man. Evil breaks down this integration.[24]

Evil is parasitic on good. The higher the level of being, the more there is for evil to destroy. Because good is thus integration and evil is the breaking down of good, there could be no evil if there were no good. The actual world and good could not exist apart. If evil were able utterly to destroy good, it, as well as everything else, would cease to exist. Only creativity and the eternal objects would be left. However, in actuality, evil as it breaks down the higher levels of integration still leaves integrated materials which are merely on a lower level. They are still good, although relatively less so than before the destructive effects of evil were felt. Evil itself is not a lesser good. It is a positive force of purpose in direct opposition to the inherent purpose of

the universe, but its action does not result in the production of an actuality which is inherently evil, but only in an actuality which is a lesser good compared to what would have been if evil had not interfered. Evil is always a destructive force, which results in the breaking down of higher goods into lower ones.

Evil is naturally unstable. It has a tendency to destroy itself. "The fact of the instability of evil is the moral order of the universe."[25] Good differs essentially from evil in that it is naturally stable. "There is a self-preservation inherent in that which is good in itself. Its destruction may come from without but not from within."[26] This fact of the natural stability of good, and the natural instability of evil would seem to insure the final victory of the former. However "this instability of evil does not necessarily lead to progress. On the contrary, the evil in itself leads to the world losing forms of attainment in which the evil manifests itself."[27] Evil can destroy itself by destroying the good to which it is attached.[29]

Because of the natural stability of good, and the innate instability of evil, the phenomenon known as conservatism has no useful place in the world. The conserva-

tive fears that we may lose emergent values from the world, and in order to prevent this, tries to turn back the stream of progress. Actually the good cannot be lost unless it is so thoroughly vitiated by evil that it is no longer good. Conservatism thus becomes a part of evil, because it is uselessly thwarting the emergence of new levels of good.

Evil is a positive force. It is not a mere lack of goodness. It is a positive and aggressive force which attacks the good. It and God are eternally opposed. Evil cannot be stable, for it is opposed to the essential order of the universe.

It appears that evil is volitional in character. It is a lesser purpose, which has come to be in conflict with the primary purpose of the universe. Because a certain degree of freedom is distributed throughout the universe it is possible for lesser purposes to form, which are opposed to the primary purposes. "Evil is the brute force of fragmentary purpose disregarding the eternal vision."[29]

This lesser purpose is evil, not by reason of its own character alone but because it conflicts with the greater good. "Evil, triumphant in its enjoyment, is so far good in itself; it is evil in its character of a destructive agent among things greater than itself."[30] It is this

destructive quality of evil, which distinguishes it. Both it and good are positive forces. "Evil is positive and destructive." The "good is positive and constructive."[31]

There is a certain amount of truth in the old insight of Zoroaster. There are two diverse principles in the world. Good and evil are in conflict. Human beings may enlist under the banner of the good. Ultimately good is more real than evil, and must be victorious.

However modern philosophy defines good in terms of order and integration, in terms of the total inter-relatedness of the universe. Also the good principle is conscious, and personal. The evil principles are not. God is unified. Evil is not.

Also objects and matter are not evil. There is a positive evil force of purpose unsubordinated to the great purpose of the universe. But things are not evil. They can be evil only in the sense that they represent a lesser good. All that is actual is good. God made everything that is actual and everything that God made is good. This is still true despite the opposing principle of evil, which endeavors to break down the greater into lesser goods.

The Personal Nature of God

God is a person. Whitehead has been very careful to avoid in his philosophy old phrases which have connotations which are vestigial remains from old ways of viewing the universe. Such ambiguity is especially prevalent among religious terms.

> "In expressing our conception of God, words such as "personal," and "impersonal", "entity," "individuality", "actual" require the closest careful watching lest in different connections we should use them in different senses, not to speak of the danger of failing to use them in any determinate sense."[32]

The ambiguity of the word "personality" comes not only from its popular use for a certain superficial social grace, but also because even in a more philosophical sense it has been colored by the concept "individuality." Also we have usually thought of persons as being static thinking substances analogous to static extended substances. The concept "personality" in popular thought is not entirely free from the old idea of the soul as composed of a slightly more rarefied kind of matter. Whitehead wishes to avoid ambiguity. Therefore the word "personality" is one which we should expect him to avoid.

However the essence of the term as applied to God is

not that God is a glorified individual of the human type, and sharing human limitations, although the concept probably has come down from anthropomorphic ideas of God, but that in the qualities in which human personality transcends the nature of the animals and of inanimate objects, God resembles the higher rather than the lower. Human personality is conscious, purposeful, and has an emotional character. To say that God is personal is essentially to say that God is a conscious, purposeful, thinking and feeling entity, not a dead or inanimate object, such as a stone. To call God personal is to use the highest term that we know of, and does not limit God's personality to the level of human personality. The essential element is the "thinking" and not the "substance."

Now if this is the meaning of "personal" as applied to God, then Whitehead believes in a personal God, even if he does not use the word. Some use the word "superpersonal" to mean exactly what others mean by "personal." Religion did not begin with this concept. The history of religion has been the "transition from God the void to God the enemy to God the companion."[33] We have come to have a sense of Presence.

Whitehead claims that we have

> "no direct vision of a personal God. The existence of God is an inference. We do have a "direct intuition of righteousness in the nature of things. The Divine personality is in the nature of an inference from the directly apprehended law of nature."[34]

Even if we did directly intuit the personal nature of God, that evidence would not be conclusive because

> "an intuition is a private psychological habit, and is without general evidential force. The wisdom of the main stream of Christian theology in refusing to countenance the notion of a direct vision of a personal God is manifest. For there is no consensus."

However there is a "large consensus" that there is a "rightness in things, partially conformed to, and partially disregarded."[35] If we are to find the God whom the modern world has lost and is seeking, we must be able to recognize Him in that "rightness." The personality of God is a legitimate inference from some of the facts of the universe as set forth in Whitehead's system. The Principle of Concretion gives us the basis for the evolution of the world toward forms and ideals not yet realized. There is a purposeful movement toward ends, that is, there is a design in the universe, whose source is God. The world as a whole is purposeful. "The physical purposes provides the creativity with complex character."[36] And above these

physical purposes, there is the fully conscious purpose of the Consequent Nature of God.

Here we come to an objection not only to the concept of personality, but also to the whole theistic concept, by one, who in many ways agrees with Whitehead. Sellars believes that no external orderer is necessary.

> "Now if we take the texture of nature to be organic or social in this large sense, is not order intrinsic to Nature? Do we need external teleology, a designer, a Spirit of rational order? I cannot see that we do. We have escaped both blind chance and an External orderer."[37]

This objection should be placed in juxtaposition with M. H. Moore's objection to the concept of potentiality in the lesser parts of an organism because in part they answer each other. Order is intrinsic to Nature. But that order must be one unified system of order, if Nature is not to lose its organic character. It is God who saves the world from a confusion due to the conflict of lesser purposes. Sellars is probably right to the extent that the Orderer is largely internal to the world rather than external. The world bears the same relation to God as the human body bears to the human personality.

However Whitehead believes that this purpose or Orderer is conscious in one aspect of his existence, and

transcendent in another. Whitehead does not seem to make consciousness part of the transcendent element in the Godhead. In transcendence, consciousness is not required. Consciousness is our knowing that we know that which surrounds us. A being wholly transcendent could be neither knowable or knowing, except of course that it might be self-conscious. It appears that Whitehead makes consciousness belong only to the Consequent Nature of God, which comes into being as the world-spirit. All actual entities are both mental and physical. "The mental pole is the link whereby the creativity is endowed with the double character of final causation and efficient causation."[38] The view that the mental is found in all parts of actuality is called "Panpsychism" and it is a view which Whitehead seems to accept. "According to the philosophy of organism, the physical and mental operations are inextricably intertwined." "The whole doctrine of mentality--from the case of God downwards--is that it is a modifying agency."[39]

Thus God is personal in the sense that his nature contains elements analogous to the higher qualities of human beings, such as consciousness, purpose, intelligence, and affection. We use personality for that level of

emergent consciousness, intelligence, and goodness which is found in human beings. God is all that, and more.

In our discussion of human personality, we discovered that personality in human beings must be a dynamic and conscious complex of relationships, or that perhaps it would be better to speak of personality as a "relator." It is the integrating element amid the welter of events and of the forms which they illustrate.

It would seem that one particular objection to the idea of personality in God arises from an inadequate consideration of the implications of the fact that even a human personality is "a generic relation between occasions of human experience."[40]

Wieman, who has been markedly influenced by Whitehead in many ways denies that God can be a person. He claims that "personality can only exist in a society." He claims that "if God is a personality he cannot derive his personality from human society because he would then be no better or stronger than we." The idea of an ideal society of angels lacks any empirical support. Finally,

> "suppose God is a personality.....because of a society in the Godhead itself. Suppose God is a society of two or three. Suppose the old doctrine of the Trinity is correct. We claim,

> in fact, that it is the only ground on which personality in God can be defended. But even that fails to make God a personality. God would then be that interaction between three members (or two or more) which sustains, generates and renders perfect the personalities in God. God would then not be a personality, but a kind of interaction between individuals, which interaction sustains and promotes all the values of personality."[41]

He defines God thus: "Positively, we would say that God is that kind of interaction between things which generates and magnifies personality and all its highest values."

Now if we are correct that personality is always a dynamic complex of relationships, this is far from adequate as a proof that God cannot be a personality. While agreeing with Wieman generally in what he says, we believe that he is mistaken in his view that an 'interaction' cannot be a 'personality.' God is an 'interaction,' but all personalities are also interactions. Or perhaps, if one would prefer to say that interactions are a part of personality, we could say that the fact of cosmic interactions, and interactions between lesser personalities would point to ~~the entirety of~~ a personal God.

A flame is a dynamic interaction between the fuel, the air, and heat. A human personality is a much more com-

plex interaction which for some strange reason can think, feel, and is conscious. It is true that the "interaction" is not the distinctive trait of personality, but personality is always an interaction which has these distinctive traits, which in Whitehead's system are also found in God. Thus God is both an interaction among personalities and a personality Himself. We lesser personalities are but strands of unity in His greater personality.

This does not mean that Whitehead would agree that "God is a personality because of a society in the Godhead itself." There is nothing--not even God--that can exist by itself. God probably finds any needed impetus to personality "from human society," and that would not necessarily prove that He is no better, or stronger than we although it might imply that he would grow as human society grows. Miss Emmet has found inklings of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity in Whitehead's doctrine of God.[42] As a matter of fact we have partially followed this division. Whitehead's God does divide into the Eternal Order of Values, the Principle of Concretion which make the universe organic in character, and the Consequent Nature of God, which saves the world, and inhabits the world as a conscious, persuasive power. However it would appear that

although Whitehead is wrestling with some of the problems which give rise to the doctrine of the Trinity, and although in both, we find a certain Threeness, yet his general point of view is quite different from that of the philosophers of the Great Councils. Canon Gore feels that "all that Dr. Whitehead is seeking to express might find better expression in the terms of the Trinitarian theology. But this is obviously not his intention."[43]

Human personality is always dynamic in character. All of us recognize that the child grows "inwisdom and in stature, and in favor with God and man." In Whitehead's system, God also grows, and because of this fact, his personality contains a dynamic element. Some have imagined that the Divine personality does not grow because it is already perfect. This usually implies a static conception of perfection. Roman Catholic theologians especially have supposed "that the complete being must contain the actualization of all possibilities and thus be incapable of growth."[44] But this is not a valid point of view, for if God fulfills all possibilities, he would contain contradictions.

Dr. Buckham denies that perfection is either inert, static, or passive. "On the contrary perfection is the

most active of all forms of being, for its activity is not striving but giving, which is the purest and highest form of activity."[45] However he feels that "the conception of God as developing would.....involve his finitude and would leave neither Final Cause nor Adequate Aid for human development."[46] There must be an element of perfection in the Godhead, toward which development moves. Whitehead seems to recognize this necessity. In his system the Divine Personality does grow with the universe, but this does not limit Him to the universe. There is a transcendent element in His nature, and it is this transcendent Order of Values amid the ideal possibilities, which gives to God an element of perfection which does not change. It is God immanent that changes. This dynamic character of the Divine Personality in Whitehead's system makes the Divine Personality more nearly analogous with human personality.

Both the human personality and God have unity. The human personality is a strand of unity within the greater unity which is God. Whitehead shows that the unity both of the Self and of God is of the same kind. He uses the Platonic conception of the Locus or Receptacle as the centre of this unity. Thus we may say that the God of Whitehead's philosophy is truly personal.

This Divine Personality

> "is the binding element in the world. The consciousness which is individual in us, is universal in him; the love which is partial in us is all embracing in him. Apart from him there could be no world because there could be no adjustment of individuality. God upon whose wisdom all forms of order depend."[47]

It is this Divine Personality which is the God of religion.

> "The depths of (His) existence lie beyond all vulgarities of praise or of power. He gives to suffering its swift insight into values which can issue from it. He is the ideal companion who transmutes what has been lost into a living fact within his own nature. He is the mirror which discloses to every creature its own greatness."[48]

> "God is the great companion--the fellow-sufferer who understands."[49]

NOTES

Chapter VI

1. Process and Reality, p. 524.
2. Ibid, pp. 521, 522.
3. Ibid, P. 525.
4. Ibid, pp. 525-531.
5. Science and the Modern World, p. 157.
6. Ibid, p. 157.
7. Process and Reality, p. 525.
8. Buckham, J. W., Christianity and Personality, p. 98.
9. Process and Reality, p. 525.
10. Adventures of Ideas, p. 205.
11. Process and Reality, p. 520.
12. Emmet, D. M., A Review of Adventures of Ideas. Hibbert Journal, Vol. 32, p. 179. January, 1934.
13. Adventures of Ideas, p. 53.
14. Buckham, J. W., Christianity and Personality, p. 94.
15. Religion in the Making, p. 68.
16. Ibid, p. 68.
17. Ibid, pp. 68, 69.
18. Ibid, p. 71.
19. Ibid, p. 77.
20. Ibid, p. 150.

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21. Religion in the Making, p. 153.

22. Ibid, p. 77.

23. Ibid, p. 95.

24. This is in line with Wieman's Interpretation of the Doctrine of Evil in Whitehead's Philosophy in the "Wrestle of Religion With Truth."

25. Religion in the Making, p. 95.

26. Ibid, p. 96.

27. Ibid, p. 96.

28. Wieman, H. N., Wrestle of Religion With Truth, p. 200.

29. Science and the Modern World, p. 275.

30. Religion in the Making, p. 95.

31. Ibid, p. 96.

32. Ibid, p. 78.

33. Ibid, pp. 16, 17.

34. Ibid, p. 63.

35. Ibid, p. 66.

36. Process and Reality, p. 426.

37. Sellars, Religion Coming of Age, p. 218.

38. Process and Reality, p. 423.

39. Ibid, p. 496.

40. Whitehead. Objects and Subjects. Philosophical Review. Vol. 41, p. 141. March, 1932.

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41. Wieman, Theocentric Religion. Contemporary American Theology, Vol. I, p. 351.

42. Emmet, Whitehead's Philosophy of Organism, pp. 252-254.

43. Gore, Charles, The Philosophy of the Good Life, p. 257.

44. Hartshorne, C., On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy. Philosophical Review. Vol. 44, p. 342.

45. Buckham, J. W., Christianity and Personality, p. 90.

46. Ibid, p. 91.

47. Religion in the Making, p. 158.

48. Ibid, pp. 154, 155.

49. Process and Reality, p. 532.

VII

CONCLUSION

We now come to the problem of the adequacy of Whitehead's system for the needs of a philosophy of religion. In such an investigation there are at least three norms by which the system can be judged. It can be judged in accordance with its closeness to the traditional philosophies of religion. It can be judged on a basis of its influence on the functioning of practical religious living, or finally an attempt can be made to see where a changing philosophy of religion is going and to understand the effect which Whitehead's system may have upon developing religious thought. Judgments upon a basis of the traditional systems are most common, and least valuable. The actual effects upon practical religious living are very important, but the most important question is that of where is the movement of thought going.

When we compare Whitehead's system with the important philosophies of religion which the recent past has brought forth, Whitehead's system seems to be marked by a kind of externality. It has been claimed that most of our knowledge of the world is external but that we can also get

inside the world and see it from within in the human consciousness. Science has been external in its approach. Religion has often studied the internal life of man. Whitehead does not deny the usefulness of the internal approach, but his own approach is generally from the external side.

By this method he often discovers the existence of the realities with which the student of the internal life of the universe is concerned, but his description of these realities seems to be vague and inadequate. For instance, his description of personality might have been much fuller if it had included a more careful study from within. Whitehead does not entirely ignore the internal approach. He recognizes that we are directly conscious of our own purposes as directive of our actions,[1] but his emphasis is upon the external.[2]

This criticism of Whitehead's system is so important that we must define the function which we believe Whitehead's system can fulfill in religious philosophy if we are to claim for it great religious importance, for it does appear that an adequate philosophy of religion must have a place for the internal as well as for the more external in life.

Now it seems that religious philosophy is something like a diamond ring. A ring has the stone which is commonly supposed to be central and all important and a setting. Now it will be discovered that actually the stone will lose most of its beauty if the setting be inappropriate and that an adequate setting can set off the stone in the best light. The setting forms the transition from the splendour of the stone to the relative drabness of the surrounding background, and it is the setting's function to prevent an aesthetic clash.

The weakness of older systems of religious philosophy has not been that the central stone was not brilliant enough, but that the settings were inadequate to give that central splendor a place as an ordered part of its environment.

We believe that it is as a setting for the religious life that Whitehead's philosophy is important. Its very quality of externality makes it fit into its environment of thought about external objects, and yet within, it has a place for the brilliance of the diamond of internal knowledge of the universe. The diamond is not there, but the place is ready for it.

If we place a large and brilliant diamond into a

well planned setting, the beauty of the ring is much greater than that of either of its parts. Similarly the diamond of the older, more internal philosophies of religion can be set within the setting of Whitehead's more external system, with the result that the new philosophy of religion should be more adequate for the needs of the present day, than any of those which have preceded it.

This external approach of Whitehead has certain values of its own besides its helpfulness for a philosophy of religion which is to be an integral part of the thought systems of our age. Although the external approach has not been as able to obtain large amounts of information about certain aspects of the universe as the internal, yet it seems to be true that the opportunities for error are much greater in our direct knowledge of consciousness than in a study of the external objective facts. Even in psychology the amount of error was great enough in the older systems so that many scientists have gone over to a more external approach in a very radical way.

The use of a more external method in religion cannot escape being helpful, because it will give us an opportunity to see religious facts from two different points of view.

Also the external approach will give to religion a certain objective quality which will strengthen its influence upon many people.

It has been seen that many of the religious insights of the past have a place, or could have a place within Whitehead's system.....We have held that his God is essentially personal although Whitehead emphasizes certain aspects of the Divine Nature, which if taken by themselves would not need to be personal. Whitehead finds a place for freedom not only in God, but in every part of the universe. No doctrine of evil is adequate, but in Whitehead's the fact that freedom is found throughout the universe, in electrons as well as in man, explains why physical evil as well as moral evil could be the result of lesser purposes which have not been integrated with the greater purposes. The doctrine of revelation on the divine side would coelesce with the doctrine of the Divine Immanence in Whitehead's system, but this is not harmful to the needs of religion. The Bible would have to be thought of as a collection of writings in which are found the insights which men have had of transcendent values as they were revealed to them by the immanence of such values in the actual universe. In Whitehead's system, the whole universe

is concreted in every entity, and so each entity is a more or less adequate revelation of God. Whitehead recognizes that the insight into the tender nature of the universe came out of the Galilean origin of Christianity.[3] There is no reason why the idea that Jesus contained a fuller revelation and a more complete incarnation of the Divine Nature, as is claimed in the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, should not be accepted, if there is empirical or other evidence in favor of it. Also the personality of Jesus could find a place in Whitehead's system even if it were one which prehended reality more closely and fully than other human personalities have been able to do. There is nothing in Whitehead's system which would necessarily deny the possibility of an Ideal personality. Whitehead's system does not include any of the traditional Christian views as to the nature of Jesus, but it is perfectly compatible with the Johannine conception of Jesus, and probably with many others.

Finally, Whitehead finds at the centre of reality a transcendent order of values among the possibilities of the universe. In his system, morality and religion will find its basis, not in the will of God, but in the Primordial Nature of God. In the permanent and transcendent

aspect of the Divine Nature, we have an Ideal toward which all things move.

In that aspect of the Divine Nature, which is actively incorporating this Ideal into the actual world, we have a reality which is closely parallel to, and essentially the same, as the Christ to whom Evangelical Religionists dedicate their lives.

Finally, the Consequent Nature of God, with its conscious and persuasive attempt to save all values by guiding creativity to the support of the greater values, gives us an aspect of God which is truly personal, and whose Presence surrounds us as a kind of Ideal companion. Underneath are the everlasting arms. The insights into the universe which human beings have obtained through the life of Jesus have been important in the development of our knowledge of God.

Many of these elements in Whitehead's system he has probably carried over from Christian thought, and it is not certain that they have been entirely unified in his thinking. As a matter of fact, the diverse elements in his conception of God sometimes seem so diverse as to be separate Gods. Also it is not certain that he would agree that his conception of God is essentially personal. The concept

of personality is one which has its important place in a more internal type of thought. We have applied it to Whitehead's God, because we found in it taken as a unity the qualities which are the essence of personality. We have found the implication of personality, because the external qualities are those of personality.

Whitehead believes that qualities parallel to those that we know in personality are not limited to God and men, but are found far down in the organic scale. The very constituent "events" of the universe partake of the nature of feeling. Each entity is bound to all others by ties, analogous to feeling, resulting from their common inclusion in the total organism of the universe. Thus it can be said that in Whitehead's system, "all things are spiritual in their degree," and that "all things embody what may fairly be called love."[4]

We can expect Whitehead's system to be especially valuable for the practical functioning of religion in the modern age. One of the great problems of the day is the relationship between the social and the personal elements in Christianity and Whitehead seems not only to have found a balance but a synthesis of the two types of emphasis. Religion and morality are concerned with the transcendent

values of the universe. One of the most important of these values seems to find its expression in integration. By dedicating itself to the fullest possible integration of the universe as a whole, the lesser personality finds one great purpose of love, around which its own lesser and discordant purposes may integrate. Thus the universe as a whole and each fragmentary personality within it all progress toward the same goal of greater interrelatedness and integration which in religious terminology is called love. It is true that the highest interest of society and of individuals is the same, but this highest purpose is not to be found among the purely selfish purposes of the unintegrated individual, but in that purpose which is the same for all individuals and for society as a whole, finding its source in the transcendent order of values in the Godhead itself, and that purpose seems to be one of order, integration, and creativity. Whitehead's system does not look backward but forward to a higher kind of personality, a more closely interrelated society, a more adequate religion, and a universe in which creativity has incorporated more of the divine plan, and divine integration.

Finally the most important norm for the judging of Whitehead's system is one which is most difficult to apply:

what is its probable place in developing religious thought? It appears as if the greatest importance of Whitehead's system will lie in its synthetic quality. Whitehead's system does not so much attempt to find new truth as to find a place for diverse truths. In many places this may be more of an eclecticism than of a synthesis, but in some cases he is able to find a synthesis, and in others he is pushing toward one. Hegel believed that thinking always progressed by a process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Whitehead's system is a step in the direction of a synthesis as between more naturalistic philosophies and those which have found an adequate place for the religious life. In his system both can find an adequate place. His system is a setting into which the future can place an adequate philosophy of religion. Thought has been unduly departmentalized in the past. We have come to the time when

> "the movement of historical, and philosophical criticism of detached questions, which on the whole has dominated the last two centuries, has done its work, and requires to be supplemented by a more sustained effort of constructive thought."[5]

NOTES

Conclusion

1. Nature and Life, p. 2.

2. There is a tendency for this emphasis upon the external to diminish somewhat in Whitehead's later books.

3. Process and Reality, p. 520.

4. Hartshorne, C., On Some Criticisms of Whitehead's Philosophy. Philosophical Review, Vol. 44, p. 340.

5. Process and Reality, p. X.

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